BURMA - STEVENSON REPORT

<body topmargin=0 leftmargin=0 marginheight=0 marginwidth=0> <table cellpadding=0 cellspacing=0 border=0><tr> <td valign="top" colspan=2 height=80 BGCOLOR="#000000" TEXT="#F7F7FF" bgproperties="fixed" background="0c200500dvldtc.gif"> <div> <FONT SIZE="5" COLOR="#FFCC66" FACE="BauerBodni BT" ><B>113 SQUADRON</B></FONT><FONT SIZE="1" COLOR="#FFFFCC" FACE="Arial" ><B>     |    </B></FONT><B> </B><A HREF="home_of_113_squadron.htm" TARGET="_top" TITLE="WELCOME"><U><B>HOME</B></U></A></div> <div> <B> </B><FONT SIZE="3" COLOR="#FFFFCC" FACE="Arial" >back to</FONT><FONT SIZE="2" COLOR="#FFFFCC" FACE="Arial" >  </FONT><FONT SIZE="2" COLOR="#00FFFF" FACE="Arial" ><A HREF="id99.htm" TARGET="_top" TITLE="THE RESEARCH ROOM"><U><B>THE RESEARCH ROOM</B></U></A></FONT></div> <div> </div> </td> </tr><tr> <td valign="top" width=215 BGCOLOR="#000000" TEXT="#F7F7FF" background="0c3d7c00dvldtc.gif"> <bR> <div> <A HREF="id123_m.htm#attack_on_highland_queen_" TARGET="TRLX_Middle" TITLE="BURMA STEVENSON REPORT"><U>HIGHLAND QUEEN ATTACK</U></A></div> <div> <A HREF="id123_m.htm#evacuation_of_rangoon_" TARGET="TRLX_Middle" TITLE="BURMA STEVENSON REPORT"><U>EVAC OF RANGOON</U></A></div> <div> <A HREF="id123_m.htm#part_vi_air_operations_covering" TARGET="TRLX_Middle" TITLE="BURMA STEVENSON REPORT"><U>RETREAT UP PROME ROAD</U></A></div> <div> <A HREF="id123_m.htm#operations_from_zigon_" TARGET="TRLX_Middle" TITLE="BURMA STEVENSON REPORT"><U>OPERATIONS FROM ZIGON</U></A></div> <div> <A HREF="id123_m.htm#operations_from_park_lane_" TARGET="TRLX_Middle" TITLE="BURMA STEVENSON REPORT"><U>OPERATIONS PARK LANE</U></A></div> <div> <A HREF="id123_m.htm#formation_of_burwing_" TARGET="TRLX_Middle" TITLE="BURMA STEVENSON REPORT"><U>FORMATION OF BURWING</U></A></div> <div> <A HREF="id123_m.htm#air_directif_9th_march_" TARGET="TRLX_Middle" TITLE="BURMA STEVENSON REPORT"><U>AIR DIRECTIF 9th MARCH</U></A></div> <div> <A HREF="id123_m.htm#formation_of_akwing_" TARGET="TRLX_Middle" TITLE="BURMA STEVENSON REPORT"><U>FORMATION AKWING</U></A></div> <div> <A HREF="id123_m.htm#part_vii___reverse_inflicted_on_mixed" TARGET="TRLX_Middle" TITLE="BURMA STEVENSON REPORT"><U>REVERSE ON MAGWE</U></A></div> <div> <A HREF="id123_m.htm#the_bomber_attack_at_mingaladon_" TARGET="TRLX_Middle" TITLE="BURMA STEVENSON REPORT"><U>ATTACK AT MINGALADON</U></A></div> <div> <A HREF="id123_m.htm#enemy_attack_on_magwe_begins_" TARGET="TRLX_Middle" TITLE="BURMA STEVENSON REPORT"><U>ATTACK ON MAGWE</U></A></div> <div> <A HREF="id123_m.htm#fighter_effort_" TARGET="TRLX_Middle" TITLE="BURMA STEVENSON REPORT"><U>FIGHTER EFFORT</U></A></div> <div> <A HREF="id123_m.htm#warning_" TARGET="TRLX_Middle" TITLE="BURMA STEVENSON REPORT"><U>WARNING</U></A></div> <div> <A HREF="id123_m.htm#the_enemy_air_action_" TARGET="TRLX_Middle" TITLE="BURMA STEVENSON REPORT"><U>ENEMY AIR ACTION</U></A></div> <div> <A HREF="id123_m.htm#enemy_action_akyab" TARGET="TRLX_Middle" TITLE="BURMA STEVENSON REPORT"><U>ENEMY ACTION AKYAB</U></A></div> <div> <A HREF="id123_m.htm#part_viii__withdrawal_of_burma_army_to" TARGET="TRLX_Middle" TITLE="BURMA STEVENSON REPORT"><U>WITHDRAWL FROM BURMA</U></A></div> <div> <A HREF="id123_m.htm#part_ix__conclusion_" TARGET="TRLX_Middle" TITLE="BURMA STEVENSON REPORT"><U>CONCLUSION</U></A></div> </td> <td valign="top" height=400 BGCOLOR="#000000" TEXT="#F7F7FF"> <bR> <bR> <div> BURMA - AIR OPERATIONS</div> <div>  Jan 1st to May 22, 1942 </div> <div> STEVENSON REPORT</div> <bR> <div> PAGE 3<FONT SIZE="3" COLOR="#FFCC66" FACE="Arial" > </FONT></div> <bR> <div> <FONT SIZE="3" COLOR="#00FFFF" FACE="Arial" ><A HREF="id121.htm" TARGET="_top" TITLE="BURMA STEVENSON REPORT"><U>BACK</U></A></FONT> </div> <bR> <div> 150. It was of paramount importance that the last vital demolition ,on a big scale should be completed without the interference of hostile aircraft and that the movement of the Army which was disposed astride the Pegu Road and in 'Rangoon should be enabled to give last cover to demolition parties and to withdraw as planned through the cross-road at Taukkyan and North up the Prome Road. The Army was tied to the road on account of the nature of the country and the fact that it was mechanised.</div> <bR> <div> 151. As already noted, the air actions over Rangoon on the 24th and 25th had inflicted severe casualties on the enemy air force. From that day until the evacuation of the Army from Rangoon had been completed, until all our convoys and ships had left the Port in secunty and until our demolition parties had been withdrawn, no enemy bomber attempted to enter what had previously been our warning zone round the airfields of Rangoon, i.e., roughly a circle 40 miles in radius from the centre of the town.</div> <bR> <div> 152. I can only assume that when their last effort to establish air superiority failed, the enemy air force were determined not to incur further wastage until Rangoon fell. Consequently the demolitions and the withdrawal of our forces from Rangoon took place in a state of absolute air superionty.</div> <bR> <div> 153. As regards the enemy effort in the battle of Pegu, air attacks took place against Maymyo, Toungoo and Bassein, whilst considerable activity was maintained over the battle area</div> <bR> <div> 154. On the 2nd March I gave instructions for the R.D.F. station, which had been made mobile to move to Magwe, to provide some R.D.F. warning for our new air base. Consequently, when the telephone observer corps system collapsed there was no' warning in the area except that provided by observation from military points and airfields.</div> <bR> <div> 155. To offset this to some extent a " Jim Crow " Hurricane was kept over Rangoon by day.</div> <bR> <div> 156. During this cntical phase, fearing that my fighter force might be caught on the ground and destroyed by surprise low flying fighter attack, I had moved them out to a newly prepared '' kutcha '' strip at Highland Queen from which offensive fighter patrols were maintained. To give the impression that the force was still at Mingaladon, wrecked aircraft fuselages and dummies were parked in the readiness position on the runways.</div> <bR> <div> 157. During this critical phase to the 7th March, the bomber effort was directed against the enemy wherever he could be found. The fighters accompanying the bomber raids came down to shoot up enemy objectives. 96,800 Ibs. of bombs were released, and a considerable number of fighter offensive and protective sorties carried out. Such objectives as enemy troop concentrations, trains, boats on the Sittang and M.T. columns were attacked with satisfactory results. The bombers operated from Magwe aerodrome using Highland Queen and John Haig as advanced bases.</div> <bR> <div> 158. General Sir Archibald Wavell, now Comma.nder-inJChief, India—to which Command Norgroup had reverted—visited Burma on the ist and 2nd March. A meeting was held at Magwe on the morning of the ist March in which the Commander-in-Chief reviewed the land and air situation. At this meeting H.E. the Governor, General Hutton and myself were present. I described the air situation and the need for reinforcing Hurricanes and Blenheims. With Rangoon now closely threatened, with our warning non-existent, with a slender fighter force of 20 serviceable Hurricanes and a few Buffaloes, with the A.V.G. force standing at 4 serviceable aircraft at Magwe, it was a position in which I said we should be unable to deny the enemy fredom of air action; while our bombing effort in support of the Army would be limited to the efforts of our quickly dwindling force of 16 bombers.</div> <bR> <DIV ALIGN="LEFT"></DIV> <div> <U> <A NAME="attack_on_highland_queen_"><IMG BORDER="0" SRC="1x1.gif" HEIGHT="1" ALIGN="bottom" WIDTH="1" HSPACE="0" VSPACE="0" ></A></U><U>Attack on Highland Queen.</U></div> <bR> <div> 159. On the 6th, an enemy formation of about 20 plus aircraft which was flying over the Japanese troops advancing through the jungle towards the Prome Road over-shot its mark and, by accident and without warning, arrived flying low over Highland Queen where our fighters, some bombers and some G.R. aircraft were on the ground.</div> <bR> <div> 160. Fortune attended us on this occasion. The enemy shooting was bad and some Hurricanes were able to take off. Although no claims were made there were indications that 2 enemy fighters were damaged or destroyed. Two aircraft of ours were destroyed on ths ground. The anti-aircraft defence of the aerodrome went into action satisfactorily. This was a raid which might well have been a decisive end to our small air force.</div> <bR> <div> 161. I immediately issued instructions for all aircraft to fly in from Highland Queen to Mingaladon, whence our last sorties were carried out.</div> <bR> <div> 162. Infiltrations by boat had taken place up the River Rangoon. Offensive action by our fighters was taken but movement continued by night. On the afternoon of the 6th March I left Wing Headquarters, Rangoon, and flew to my Headquarters at Magwe.</div> <bR> <div> 163. Our fighter force had for some days been split between Magwe and the forward bases round Rangoon, Highland Queen and Mingaladon. The Hurricane force which was then standing at about 15 aircraft was a mixed one comprising commanders and pilots of 17, 135 and 136 Squadrons, and operating from the forward bases was maintained from Magwe, wheire (maintenance inspections were carried out. The P-40's of the A.V.G. which had done such sterling work were now suffering from acute unserviceability due to lack of spares and replacement aircraft. I therefore placed them in the defence of the air base at Magwe. This made good my promise to General Chennault that I would not employ them at airfields without adequate warning.</div> <bR> <DIV ALIGN="LEFT"></DIV> <div> <U> <A NAME="evacuation_of_rangoon_"><IMG BORDER="0" SRC="1x1.gif" HEIGHT="1" ALIGN="bottom" WIDTH="1" HSPACE="0" VSPACE="0" ></A></U><U>Evacuation of Rangoon.</U></div> <bR> <div> 164. I had been with General Alexander until 14.00 hours. He had told me of his decision to evacuate Rangoon, and the code word for blowing demolitions and evacuation was issued just before midnight on 6th March. With his agreement I moved Headquarters " X " Wing from Rangoon to Zigon, the firs.t '' kutcha '' strip froim which we would -operate in support of the Army's withdrawal along the Prome Road. A small party of Officers and airmen were left behind to complete the demolition of the operations room and the facilities at Norgroup Headquarters. They were then to go on to Mingaladon and help to complete the demolitions at this airfield. This party came out with the Army.</div> <bR> <DIV ALIGN="LEFT"></DIV> <div> <U> <A NAME="part_vi_air_operations_covering"><IMG BORDER="0" SRC="1x1.gif" HEIGHT="1" ALIGN="bottom" WIDTH="1" HSPACE="0" VSPACE="0" ></A></U><U>PART VI—AIR OPERATIONS COVERING WITHDRAWAL UP THE PROME ROAD.</U></div> <bR> <div> 165. There was a heavy haze on the 7th and 8th, which interfered with- observation <I>by </I>fighters, made worse by the -great pall of smoke from the burning oil which rose to a height of 15,000 feet and was blown North over the area of operations as far as' Tharrawadi-. General Alexander's force failed to dislodge the road block at Mile 22 on the 7th, but on the morning of the 8th was able to overcome this resistance, and the withdrawal of our Army commenced North up the Prome Road.</div> <bR> <DIV ALIGN="LEFT"></DIV> <div> <U> <A NAME="operations_from_zigon_"><IMG BORDER="0" SRC="1x1.gif" HEIGHT="1" ALIGN="bottom" WIDTH="1" HSPACE="0" VSPACE="0" ></A></U><U>Operations from Zigon.</U></div> <bR> <div> 166. The rough surface of Zigon proved unsatisfactory for Hurricanes. I had to decide whether to risk damaging Hurricanes—which when damaged might not be repaired—or to operate the fighters from Magwe where their range would not have enabled them to provide security over our troops. The following da/ from Zigon the fighter effort was maintained.</div> <bR> <div> 167 The column of our withdrawing Army was reported by aircrews to be some 40 miles long, mostly M.T. vehicles and tanks—an admirable target for enemy bomb action in country where there was little or no cover from air attack and no possibility of getting off the long straight tarmac road.</div> <bR> <div> 168. But the state of air superiority finally established on 25th February still continued. Fighter patrols were carried out over the line from Zrgon to Rangoon. The Army, without molestation from the enemy air force, was thus able to take up and consolidate its position on the Petpadan-Tharrawaddy line.</div> <bR> <div> 169. As regards fighter sweeps to secure the withdrawal, the Hurricanes at Zigon carried out about 12 to 18 sorties a day until " X " Wing had withdrawn from Prome to Magwe on the 11th March. It was then disbanded on the formation of Burwing at Magwe. Group Captain Singer, who arrived on the I2th March, took over the command of Akwing, which was then in formation at Akyab.</div> <bR> <div> 170. Operations from Zigon resulted in the tail unit of a Hurricane giving way on an average of 1 in every 5 landings. A bamboo skid was fitted to the tail of the Hurricane which then took off and landed at Magwe for repair. 2 Buffaloes were badly wrecked by the aerodrome surface and were eventually burnt. 1 Blenheim and 1 Lysander were also rendered unserviceable, but were repaired and flown out before the airfield was left.</div> <bR> <div> 171. The sole Japanese air attack driven home at this time was directed against the town of Tharrawaddy, where the bomb lift of 10 bombers was disposed of on civilian quarters causing a number of civilian casualties.</div> <bR> <div> 172. G.R. Reconnaissance in the Gulf of Martaban and the Bay of Bengal continued and escort was provided for the last convoy which earned detachments and /demolition parties. All ships got safely away.</div> <bR> <DIV ALIGN="LEFT"></DIV> <div> <U> <A NAME="operations_from_park_lane_"><IMG BORDER="0" SRC="1x1.gif" HEIGHT="1" ALIGN="bottom" WIDTH="1" HSPACE="0" VSPACE="0" ></A></U><U>Operations from Park Lane.</U></div> <bR> <div> 173. The range for fighters was now shortened and, consequently, " X " Wing moved to Park Lane, a " kutcha " strip North of Prome. This move was completed on the night of the 9th March. The enemy did not locate and attack the fighters at Zigon or Park Lane.</div> <bR> <div> 174. Fighting continued and on the 25th March the Army had taken up their position on the Prome .line, with the 1st Bur. Division's move from Toungoo to Allanmyo in progress.</div> <bR> <div> 175. During this period, from the 7th March to the 2ist March, the bomber force was either held in readiness for close support of the Army or attacks were made in order to reduce the scale of air attack and so aid the fighters in their task of security. Attacks on enemy objectives in support of the Army were also carried out. A total of 31,500 Ibs. of bombs was released with good results on such objectives as troop concentrations, aerodromes, road and railway communication and river craft. Constant reconnaissance was earned out over the entire front towards Rangoon and in the Valley of the Sittang, while a close watch was kept on our old air bases in the Rangoon area and at Moulmein for signs of the arrival of the enemy air force and reinforcements. Some effort, however, was wasted because bombers available were held standing by for objectives which the Army did not provide.</div> <bR> <div> 176. The enemy attacked Toungoo on the I7th March and carried out reconnaissance of our airfields up the Burma Road, Tangan, Namsang, Nyaumglebin and Meiktila—obviously searching for our air force.</div> <bR> <DIV ALIGN="LEFT"></DIV> <div> <U> <A NAME="formation_of_burwing_"><IMG BORDER="0" SRC="1x1.gif" HEIGHT="1" ALIGN="bottom" WIDTH="1" HSPACE="0" VSPACE="0" ></A></U><U>Formation of Burwing.</U></div> <bR> <div> 177. Burwing, comprising No. 17 Hurricane, No. 45 Bomber Squadron, the elements of an Army Co-operation Flight, 1 weak A.V.G: Squadron and the R.D.F. Station, had been formed at Magwe under the command of Group Captain Seton Broughall. This was a fully mobile mixed Army support force which, by instructions from Air Headquarters, India, was placed under the operational control of General Alexander on the i8th March.</div> <bR> <DIV ALIGN="LEFT"></DIV> <div> <U> <A NAME="air_directif_9th_march_"><IMG BORDER="0" SRC="1x1.gif" HEIGHT="1" ALIGN="bottom" WIDTH="1" HSPACE="0" VSPACE="0" ></A></U><U>Air Directif—9th March.</U></div> <bR> <div> 178. On the 9th March I flew to Akyab to "meet Air Marshal (now Air Chief Marshal) Sir Richard Peirse, the Air Officer Cornmanding - in - chief, Air Forces in India.</div> <bR> <div> 179. The Air Officer Comanding-in-Chief issued a Directif in which I was told to maintain my two mixed Wings at Magwe and Akyab and to support the Army in Burma and to organise the air defence of Calcutta, Asansol and Tatanagar in India,' and of Digboi oil installation in Assam; also to continue from India offensive bombing operations in support of the Army in Burma. Additionally, a further role of the force was reconnaissance and the attack of enemy surface vessels m the Bay of Bengal in aid of the security of our sea communications.</div> <bR> <DIV ALIGN="LEFT"></DIV> <div> <U> <A NAME="formation_of_akwing_"><IMG BORDER="0" SRC="1x1.gif" HEIGHT="1" ALIGN="bottom" WIDTH="1" HSPACE="0" VSPACE="0" ></A></U><U>Formation of Akwing.</U></div> <bR> <div> 180. My Headquarters were moved from Magwe to Akyab on the I2th March, where I commenced forming Akwing. On the 17th this Wing comprised 135 Squadron, armed with obsolete Huincane I's and 1 Hurricane II, a G.R. Flight and a small air communications detachment. It was proposed to make good the warning (R.D.F.) and to build the Wing up with 1 Bomber Squadron <FONT SIZE="2" COLOR="#FF0000" FACE="Arial" ><B>(113 Squadron)</B></FONT> when Blenheims became available from flow and 1 G.K. Squadron (139 Squadron) when Hudsons became available.</div> <bR> <div> 181. On the 17th March I flew to Calcutta to meet the Commander-m-Chief and the Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief. My Headquarters was in process of opening in Calcutta.</div> <bR> <DIV ALIGN="LEFT"></DIV> <div> <U> <A NAME="part_vii___reverse_inflicted_on_mixed"><IMG BORDER="0" SRC="1x1.gif" HEIGHT="1" ALIGN="bottom" WIDTH="1" HSPACE="0" VSPACE="0" ></A></U><U>PART VII — REVERSE INFLICTED ON MIXED WING AT MAGWE.</U></div> <bR> <div> 182. On the 22nd March I returned to Burma to inspect Akwing at Akyab and Burwing at Magwe. On landing at Akyab I received a telegram from Group Captain Seton Broughall to say that .the enemy had attacked Magwe I force the previous day. This was immediately followed Dy a signal  telling me that heavy attacks had recommenced and closing the aerodrome to approaching aircraft. He reported that nearly all the first-line aircraft had been written off or damaged and asked for approval to move to Lashio and Loiwing to rent- I telegraphed agreement and flew on to Mandalay wheie I arranged for Group Captain Seton "Broughall to meet me.</div> <bR> <DIV ALIGN="LEFT"></DIV> <div> <U> <A NAME="the_bomber_attack_at_mingaladon_"><IMG BORDER="0" SRC="1x1.gif" HEIGHT="1" ALIGN="bottom" WIDTH="1" HSPACE="0" VSPACE="0" ></A></U><U>The Bomber Attack at Mingaladon.</U></div> <bR> <div> 183. Examining this action in full detail: — On the 20th March reconnaissance carried out by Burwing had disclosed concentrations of the enemy air force taking place in the Rangoon area. More than 50 aircraft were reported on our old airfield at Mmgaladon. Group Captain Seion Broughall decided to attack the following morning in an effort to reduce the scale of attack in Burma which his intelligence staff had put at 400 plus in all. A raid of ten Hurricanes and nine Blenheims of 45 Squadron accordingly took off The Blenheims were intercepted by enemy Naval " 0 " fighters 40 miles North of Rangoon and fought their way in to Mingaladon. The .Bomb lift of 9,000 Ibs. with stick adaptors was dropped on the runways among the enemy aircraft. The formation fought their 'way iback to Tharrawaddy. During this gallant engagement in which 18 enemy fighters were encountered the Blenheims shot down two enemy fighters and claimed two probably destroyed and two damaged. Most of our aircraft were shot up but none were shot down. There were no casualties to personnel except one pilot wounded.</div> <bR> <DIV ALIGN="LEFT"></DIV> <div> <U>Low Flying Fighter Attack on Mingaladon.</U></div> <bR> <div> 184. The Hurricanes carried out a low flying attack. Nine enemy fighters were claimed as destroyed in air combat while 16 enemy bombers and fighters were destroyed or damaged on the ground. This was a magnificent air action. Some Hurricanes were badly shot up while one crashed on our side of the line through lack of petrol, following combat. O.C. Burwing intended to repeat the attack that afternoon, ,but while final preparations were being made for this sortie, the enemy commenced their considerable attack on the air base at Magwe.</div> <bR> <div> 185. It should be appreciated that on this day at Magwe all serviceable operational aircraft, fighters and bombers, of my command were present with the exception of one Hurricane II and nine worn-out Hurricane I's, ex O.T.U., at Akyab.</div> <bR> <DIV ALIGN="LEFT"></DIV> <div> <U> <A NAME="enemy_attack_on_magwe_begins_"><IMG BORDER="0" SRC="1x1.gif" HEIGHT="1" ALIGN="bottom" WIDTH="1" HSPACE="0" VSPACE="0" ></A></U><U>Enemy Attack on Magwe Begins.</U></div> <bR> <bR> <div> 186. Over a period of some 25 hours, commencing at 13.23, Magwe was attacked in foice by the enemy. In all, the scale of attack reached about 230 fighters and bombers, which included 166 Army 96 and 97 medium and heavy bombers. It is calculated that a great weight of bombs, some 200 tons, were accurately released in patterns during this attack.</div> <bR> <div> 187 Similar attacks had been carried out against Rangoon without decisive effect. But at Rangoon there was good warning and the number of fighters available against such attacks was usually 20, rising on occasion to the high figure of 45.</div> <bR> <DIV ALIGN="LEFT"></DIV> <div> <U> <A NAME="fighter_effort_"><IMG BORDER="0" SRC="1x1.gif" HEIGHT="1" ALIGN="bottom" WIDTH="1" HSPACE="0" VSPACE="0" ></A></U><U>Fighter Effort</U><I><U>.</U></I></div> <bR> <div> 188. 21 fighters were present at Magwe when attacked, but as a direct result of the air action which had been fought over Mingaladon in the morning, <I>the number of serviceable aircraft at readiness to take to the air was only 12. </I>It should here be mentioned that the leaders and many of the fighter pilots at Magwe had been at two minute readiness day after day, from dawn to dusk, for a period of some eight weeks.</div> <div> <U> <A NAME="warning_"><IMG BORDER="0" SRC="1x1.gif" HEIGHT="1" ALIGN="bottom" WIDTH="1" HSPACE="0" VSPACE="0" ></A></U></div> <DIV ALIGN="LEFT"></DIV> <div> <U>Warning.</U></div> <bR> <div> 189. The only observer corps system remaining to the East and South-East was the observer post belt as far South as Toungoo and Prome on the mam line of communication, reporting through Mandalay, and a chain of posts on the railway line Pyinmana-Kyaukpadaung which reported direct to Magwe operations room over an R.A.F. W/T. link. There was no observer corps system to the West and North- East of Magwe—an outflanking avenue used by the enemy during this attack. The R.D.F. set was of wrong type, its arc of observation was to the South-East. The equipment had given three months hard service and no spares had been available. The warning was weak and unreliable.</div> <bR> <DIV ALIGN="LEFT"></DIV> <div> <U> <A NAME="the_enemy_air_action_"><IMG BORDER="0" SRC="1x1.gif" HEIGHT="1" ALIGN="bottom" WIDTH="1" HSPACE="0" VSPACE="0" ></A></U><U>The Enemy Air Action.</U></div> <bR> <div> 190. At 13.00 hours on the 21st March, a report was received of a single unidentified aircraft approaching and two Hurricanes were sent off to intercept, but were unable to make contact. At 13.23 hours the approach of an enemy formation was confirmed and all available fighters took off. But they numbered only four Hurricanes and six P.40s. At 13.30, 21 bombers escorted by ten fighters attacked, bombing and machine gunning the airfield. Our fighters intercepted and "destroyed four enemy aircraft with one probable and one damaged, but the weight of the attack got home and considerable damage resulted in which communications were destroyed.</div> <bR> <div> 191. The enemy followed this up with further raids at 14.10 and 14.30. In all the scale ot attack was 59 bombers and 24 fighters that day.</div> <bR> <div> 192. On the 22nd March, plots of movements were received from the R.D.F. set at 08.04 and 08 11 hours. Immediately afterwards there was a temporary breakdown of the W/T link which, combined with interference, prevented the reception of plots in the operations room until the enemy attack had developed at 08.45 hours. Two Hurricanes had been sent off to intercept a high flying enemy reconnaissance aircraft heard over the airfield at 08.30. They had not yet made contact when at 06.47 hours 27 bombers with an escort of ten plus fighters appeared over the aerodrome, followed a quarter of an hour later by a second -wave of 27 bombers also with fighter escort.' As no warning of these raids had been received, no further fighters were sent off to engage. The two Hurricanes already in the air engaged the Japanese formation and damaged two.</div> <bR> <div> 193. Considerable damage was sustained. The runways were rendered unserviceable, communications were broken down and a number of aircraft, both ibombers and fighters, were destroyed on the ground.</div> <bR> <div> 194. Immediately afterwards, the Commander of the Second Pursuit Squadron, A.V.G. reported to Group Captain Seton Broughall that in view of the absence of warning and the scale of attack he was compelled by the terms of his instructions from General Chennault to withdraw his remaining fly able aircraft to refit- At this stage of the action only three P.40s and three Hurricanes remained flyable, the Hurricanes alone being operationally serviceable. The A.V.G.'s P.40s withdrew to Loiwrng that afternoon followed by their ground party.</div> <bR> <div> 195. At 13.30 hours reconnaissance aircraf: were again reported approaching and two of the three remaining Hurricanes were sent up but failed to intercept. While they were returning to land at 14.30 the enemy again commenced his attacks with two waves of 27 and 26 bombers respectively, each accompanied by fighter escort. This terminated the enemy attacks.</div> <bR> <div> 196. Great damage had been done and 9 Blenheims and at least 3 P.40s  were destroyed on the ground, 5 Blenheims were unserviceable, while 3 Hurricanes had been destroyed in air combat. The remaining 20 aircraft (6 Blenheims, 3 P.40's and 11 Hurricanes) were flyable but unserviceable due to normal unserviceability or damage from enemy action. These aircraft, except the P.40s, were flown out to Akyab.</div> <bR> <div> 197. This grave reverse to Burwing—the R.A.F. detachment in Upper Burma—was the result of our weakness in fighters, the weakness of the warning system at Magwe and the complete absence of aircraft pens and bad dispersal arrangements at this airfield so hurriedly occupied. There has been a good deal of criticism of the subsequent hasty move of Burwing from Magwe, while it had an adverse effect on the morale of both the Army and the civil population.</div> <bR> <div> 198. The convoy left Magwe for Lashio and Loiwing early on the morning of the 23rd. Salvage and refuelling parties were left behind.</div> <bR> <div> 199. On the nights of the 22nd and 23rd respectively, I met General Alexander and Group Captain Secoh Broughall at Maymyo. It was connrmed that Burwing would De withdrawn to .Lashio and Loiwmg—the only remaining aerodrome where fair warning existed—for refitting.</div> <bR> <div> 200. In the meantime it was proposed to try and make good the warning at Magwe, to put it into a proper state of defence and fit for Burwing to return there for operations. As the convoy had already left Magwe I issued instructions for the R.D.F set to be turned round and sent back to Magwe and for the salvage and working parties at Magwe to be strengthened.</div> <bR> <div> 201. Loiwing was the only air field left with reasonable warning and therefore the proposal to leave Magwe and to refit at Loiwing was not unsound despite the great distance of the latter airfield from the area in which the Army was operating. By use of the advanced landing grounds, limited support could be given to the Army until the defence at Magwe was satisfactorily completed and the aerodrome reoccupied. At Lashio warning was weak.</div> <bR> <div> 202. As events turned out it would not have been possible to reoccupy Magwe since the airfield</div> <div> fell into enemy hands 3 weeks later and the organisation oi the waining system and the provision of works—for which only limited labour then existed—could not have been done in time. Additionally, the observer corps belt in the Sittang Valley and the Valley of the Irrawaddy was gradually being rolled up and with it any warning from this source.</div> <bR> <DIV ALIGN="LEFT"></DIV> <div> <U> <A NAME="enemy_action_akyab"><IMG BORDER="0" SRC="1x1.gif" HEIGHT="1" ALIGN="bottom" WIDTH="1" HSPACE="0" VSPACE="0" ></A></U><U>Enemy Action—Akyab</U></div> <bR> <div> 203. The enemy had also found our small force at Akyab. A similar action took place which commenced on the 23rd, was repeated on the 24th and on the 27th. Our fighters intercepted on 2 occasions inflicting a loss of 4 enemy aircraft destroyed and 3 probably detroyed for a cost of 6 Hurricanes.</div> <bR> <div> 204. Although warning was received on the 27th, low flying enemy fighters caught our small force unprepared on the ground on this occasion. 2 Hurricanes got into the air and engaged, 1 being shot down. 7 Hurricanes were destroyed on the ground and a Valencia. Instructions had already been issued by Air Headquarters, India, to withdraw Akwing from Akyab to Chittagong as warning was so weak. Akyab would continue to be an advanced landing ground for refuelling aircraft and to enable our Hudson reconnaissance to reach the Andaman Islands. A small R.D.F. set with a limited range of 20 miles, had been flown in and was operating, but the observer corps warning for Akyab was poor. The posts were few, only the outlines of communication existing owing to the difficult nature of the country.</div> <bR> <div> 205. These two actions—at Magwe and at Akyab—in effect terminated the R.A.F. activities based in Burma. The supply of aircraft now became the critical factor. The necessity to build up our defence in North Eastern India and Ceylon brought about a decision by the Commander -in-Chief, India, not to re-equip Burwing. The maintenance of a small force in Burma was uneconomical in view of the lack of warning and increasing weight of attack. Indeed, such air forces of ours operating in these circumstances would be destroyed piecemeal, giving but small returns for considerable losses.</div> <bR> <div> 206. Burwing continued, however, as an organisation, and although bombers were flown in to Lashio and Loiwing to operate for a few days and return to Calcutta, very little could be achieved. Eight Hurricanes that were flown in on 6th April lasted only a few days in the face of Japanese attacks on Loiwing.</div> <bR> <div> 207. With the reverse that the Chinese 5th Army sustained on the Southern Shan front on 20th and 2ist April which led to the rapid advance of the Japanese to Lashio, Burwing was withdrawn to China to provide British refuelling parties at main Chinese air bases. The personnel of 17 Squadron were withdrawn via Myitkyina to take their part—re-equipped with Hurricane IFs—in the Calcutta defence.</div> <bR> <div> 208. But using the depth towards India, our bomber operations were continued on a slight but growing scale. Much remained still to be done for the support of the Army and the evacuation of our wounded and civilians.</div> <bR> <DIV ALIGN="LEFT"></DIV> <div> <U> <A NAME="part_viii__withdrawal_of_burma_army_to"><IMG BORDER="0" SRC="1x1.gif" HEIGHT="1" ALIGN="bottom" WIDTH="1" HSPACE="0" VSPACE="0" ></A></U><U>PART VIII.—WITHDRAWAL OF BURMA ARMY TO INDIA.</U></div> <bR> <div> 209. General Alexander's Army moved from the oil field area through the dry zone of Upper Burma to Mandalay with Headquarters at Shwebo, the final withdrawal taking place across the River Chindwin through Kalewa and over the Manipur Road through Tamu. The Army passed through the forward screen of 4th Corps troops on the Lochao pass on the 18th May and General Alexander's force finally reached Imphal on the 20th May.</div> <bR> <div> 210. The enemy air force now extended their patrols over a wide area in Northern Burma and carried out attacks on Lashio, Mandalay, Loiwing and Meiktila. Support was given to their forces operating against our Allies in the Taunggyi and Mawlaik areas whilst flying boats based on the Andaman Islands commenced attacks on shipping in the Bay of Bengal between 28th March and 5th April.</div> <bR> <div> 211. The Japanese reinforcement of Burma took place during the first week in April. Under the cover of a vigorous attack on Ceylon and on our shipping in the Bay of Bengal on 6th April a convoy of ships reached Rangoon. We were powerless to prevent this. Fortress aircraft of the U.S.A.A.C., however, attacked with five and a half tons of bombs an enemy force in the Andamans and straddled a cruiser and a transport. Further night flying attacks were carried out on the enemy convoy at Rangoon with useful results—fires and explosions being seen in the dock area.</div> <bR> <div> 212. During the eight weeks from 21st March, when the Magwe action took place, until May 20th, when the Burmarmy was finally withdrawn to India, action with bombers and fighters continued against the Japanese in Burma.</div> <bR> <div> 213. The fighter action was limited to such fighter sorties as could be carried out within the range of the Mohawk Squadron based at Dinjan. Bomber action.was exerted either from aerodromes" in Assam—Tezpur and Dinjan—or from bases in the Calcutta area, using Chittagong as a forward landing ground. One hundred and three tons of bombs were released on the enemy in these attacks. On arrival in Eastern India Squadrons were reformed and aircraft reconditioned slowly but as quickly as possible.</div> <bR> <div> 214. On the I2th April the first attack was made in support of General Alexander's right flank, when 9,000 Ibs. of bombs were dropped on Japanese troops" at Nyaungbintha. The enemy and his transport were also attacked at Singbaungwe, Allanmyo, Magwe, Sandoway and Taungup. In all 15,000 Ibs. of bomb were released.</div> <bR> <div> 215. Attacks, helped by some long range bombers of the U.S.A.A.C., continued on objectives of all kinds. In all 58 raids took place in support of the Army's withdrawal, some to reduce the scale of air attack and the remainder in direct support of the Army. Most of the bombing took place- on General Alexander's right flank, although three raids were directed against such places as Mongpawn, Laikha and Kongchaiping on the Chinese front.</div> <bR> <div> 216. Such airfields as Mingaladon, Akyab and Myitkyina were kept under a harassing scale of attack. Operations against Akyab and Myitkyina were particularly effective and when the enemy attempted to establish himself there on forward bases, bomber action made these untenable by the destruction of his first-line aircraft on the ground.</div> <bR> <div> 217. Of the 58 raids, 13 were undertaken by aircraft of the U.S.A.A.C. and 45 by the R.A.F. A total of 231,900 Ibs. of bombs in all were dropped, mostly followed by low flying machine gun attacks</div> <bR> <div> 218. The enemy were using river craft to outflank the Army in Burma. This line of communication was continuously harassed by our aircraft and a total of some 30,000 Ibs. of bombs were released on steamers, barges and wharves while the attack on a concentration of river craft at Monywa on the 4th and 5th May was, by its delaying action, largely instrumental in preventing the Japanese encircling movement of the right flank of our forces, then withdrawing from Yu to Kalewa, a movement which if successful would have proved embarrassing to our Army.</div> <bR> <div> 219. A single Blenheim which had attacked -Akyab on the 22nd May was engaged by 4 Army o.i fighters. The fight lasted 20 minutes and was broken off by the remaining 3 fighters when 70 miles out to sea the aircraft of their leader, the Japanese air ace Lt.-Col. Takeo Kato, was shot down in flames. No other Allied aircraft attacked Akyab on that day.</div> <bR> <div> 220. Requests for bombing action and tactical reconnaissance were made by General Alexander to Headquarters in Calcutta. Reconnaissances continued, 55 being completed for Burm army.</div> <bR> <div> 221. No. 31 air transport Squadron had been placed at my disposal equipped with D C.2 and later some D.C.3 aircraft. This Squadron did magnificent work. Their daily effort was about 3 aircraft and considerable air transport requirements had to be met. Food had to be dropped on the 3 routes along which the evacuation of civilians from Burma was taking place. These routes ran from Shwebo-Kalewa-Tamu to Imphal, from Myitkyina- Mainkwan- Shingbwiyang  to Ledo and from Katha- Indaw- Homalin/Tonhe to Imphal. Evacuees travelling along these routes required supplies of food and medical stores to maintain them during their march to India. Additionally, many of our wounded were evacuated by air from Magwe, Shwebo and Myitkyina in turn as the battle moved northward. Civilians were also evacuated when there were no wounded to move.</div> <bR> <div> 222. In all a total of  8,616 persons, which included 2,600 wounded, were flown out to India and 109,652 Ibs. of supplies were dropped for victualling refugees and troops. In carrying out this task we had the help of D C-3 aircraft of the American Air Force—I have to record the good work carried out by these crews.</div> <bR> <div> 223. About the middle of March a serious situation had risen in .the Bay of Bengal. In the Port of Calcutta there was some one-quarter of a million tons of shipping. It was not known how long the enemy naval force would remain within striking distance of our line of sea communication between Calcutta and Ceylon. There were none of H.M. ships available at this time to provide the necessary cover to secure this shipping now also within the range of attack of the enemy long range bombers based at Mingaladon and Magwe.</div> <bR> <div> 224. Instructions were issued for the Port to be cleared. There were two courses of action —either to sail convoys close in shore and to provide what fighter protection against bomb attack—and bomber protection against attack by surface units—as was practicable or to use diversional sailing which would spread the ships over a large area in the Bay of Bengal. The latter course was chosen.</div> <bR> <div> 225. It seemed possible that the attacks of our coast-wise shipping on the 6th April weie an offensive move covering the arrival of the large convoy of troops in Rangoon. Consequently it was likely that if enemy air reconnaissance could be prevented—the sailing of this large tonnage of shipping over a short period might be secured from enemy surface and air attack, since the enemy would be unaware of the operation.</div> <bR> <div> 226 We knew where the enemy reconnaissance force was. Nine four-engined and twoengined reconnaissance flying boats had been located at Port Blair. On the I4th April this figure had risen to 13. Moreover, there weie indications that the enemy had developed the aerodrome at Port Blair and that local fighter defence had been put in. Two out of the 3 serviceable Hudsons of 139 (now 62) Squadron, the only aircraft that could (refuelling at Akyab) make the range, were instructed to carry out an attack with the object of destroying and damaging all aircraft of this reconnaissance force. A determined low-flying attack was carried,out in which 2 twin-engined boats were left burning, 1 four-engined flying boat left sinking and all the other flying boats were believed to be damaged. This attack was repeated on the 18th, when 2 Hudsons again attacked 12 four-engined flying boats. Two of these were destroyed and 3 severely damaged. On both occasions the enemy were moored in lines and the Hudsons carried out a number of mast-height runs on them using their turret guns. On the 18th, Navy " O " fighters engaged our 2 aircraft—1 failed to return and the second was hit by cannon shell and machine gun fire. After these attacks this enemy reconnaissance force remained inactive. Not only during the critical time when some 70 of our ships made the passage through the Bay of Bengal, but until the end of July no activity by it was recorded.</div> <bR> <DIV ALIGN="LEFT"></DIV> <div> <U> <A NAME="part_ix__conclusion_"><IMG BORDER="0" SRC="1x1.gif" HEIGHT="1" ALIGN="bottom" WIDTH="1" HSPACE="0" VSPACE="0" ></A></U><U>PART IX.—CONCLUSION.</U></div> <bR> <div> 227. To summarize, during this air action which commenced on the 23rd December, a small Allied air force, consisting of 1Squadron of the A.V.G., the equivalent of 2 Hurricane Squadrons, the equivalent of 1Bomber Squadron, 2 Army Co-operation Bomber Squadrons and the equivalent of half a G.R. Squadron, engaged the Japanese air force in the defence of Rangoon and in the support of our Army in Tenasserim and .Burma. But the early fall of Rangoon, diversion of reinforcements and the shortage of aircraft equipment prevented the air force building up to 16 Squadrons (6 Fighters, 7 Bombers, 2 Army Co-operation and 1 G.R.) and full maintenance promised on programme. Up to the fall of Rangoon—by which we lost our warning system and our organised airfields, in this vicinity—air superiority over Rangoon had been maintained and after its fall continued until the Magwe action on the 21st March.</div> <bR> <div> 228. During this period the enemy, finally unable to subject the base of Rangoon to unrestricted day bombing, which would have given him the best chance of surrounding and destroying the Army, turned his effort to defend his troops and aid their advance. In Tenasserim, enemy day bombing attacks were carried out on our forward troops and Headquarters. Although support was given, our attempts to prevent this bombing were not successful, it being impossible in the circumstances of poor warning and shortage of fighter equipment.</div> <bR> <div> 229. It is a remarkable fact that from February 25th—when the enemy's last attack to achieve air superiority over Rangoon failed —he would not face our fighter force until Rangoon was in his hands and considerable reinforcements had been flown into the country after the fall of Singapore. Consequently, this absolute state of air superiority remained over Rangoon at this critical time—and no " Namsos " here took place.</div> <bR> <div> 230. On March 21st he began his determined attack to stamp out our now fast dwindling air force at Magwe and Akyab. Having achieved this, although good bombing objectives were constantly present as our Army withdrew to India, he did not follow up his success by attacking our moving columns. Thus the casualties to our Army from enemy air action during withdrawal over great distances with poor cover from air attack were small. This may well have been because the enemy did not know the temporary success that he had achieved. The main weight of the enemy bomber attack was directed on such places as Prome, Mandalay and Maymyo, where great damage resulted with considerable moral effect on the civil population. The bases at Toungoo, Heho, Namsang, Lashio and Loiwing were constantly searched and attacked, though except at the latter there were no aircraft present.</div> <bR> <div> 231. Norgroup was then using the depth to India, and with its base organisation being hurriedly prepared in the Calcutta area and up the Valley of the 'Brahmaputra, was able with what resources were available, to continue a harassing scale of bombing attack in Burma with some fighter action in the North. By the nature of the campaign and the shortage of warning, of aircraft, of equipment, and of maintenance, we were unable to maintain our 2 mixed Wings in Upper Burma and Akyab.</div> <bR> <div> 232. In the Burma campaign the main brunt of the fighting was borne by the P.40 Squadrons of the A.V.G. They were the first in the field with pilots well trained and with good fighting equipment. Their gallantry in action won the admiration of both services.</div> <bR> <div> 233. Accprding to the records available in the Intelligence staff of Norgroup, 233 enemy fighters and bombers were claimed destroyed in the air in this campaign, of which the A.V.G. claimed 179 and the R.A.F. 54. Fifty-eight were claimed destroyed on the ground, 38 by the A.V.G. and 20 by the R.A.F. Seventy-six were claimed probably destroyed, 43 by the A.V.G. and 33 by the R.A.F. One hundred and sixteen were claimed damaged, 87 by the A.V G. and 29 by the R.A.F.</div> <bR> <div> 234. From January 1st the cost in losses was 38 fighters shot down by the enemy in air combat. Of these 16 were P.40’s and 22 Buffaloes and Hurricanes, but the majority of pilots were fortunately saved. <B>I regret to report that there were 2 substantiated incidents when Japanese figher pilots attacked and killed our fighter pilots while descending by parachute.</B></div> <bR> <div> 235. As regards bombers, 8 failed to return from operations.</div> <bR> <div> 236. Our losses on the ground due to enemy action were 51 aircraft, 17 fighters, 23 Blenheims, 4 Hudsons. The remainder were transport and communication aircraft.</div> <bR> <div> 237. Comparable with the total of 233 enemy fighters and bombers claimed to have been shot down in air combat by the A.V.G. and the R.A.F., the Allies' losses were 46. Thus an average of slightly more than 5 enemy aircraft were claimed shot down for each of our aircraft lost.</div> <bR> <div> 238. We destroyed more of the enemy's aircraft on the ground than the enemy destroyed of ours. We made no claim moreover in respect of enemy aircraft destroyed on the ground by bombing attack, the number of which must have been considerable.</div> <bR> <div> 239. The bomber action in close support of the Army has been described. Slight as the effort was, valuable results were achieved. Counter offensive bombing action to reduce the scale of attack made an effective contribution towards the maintenance of air superiority over Rangoon.</div> <bR> <div> 240. The evacuation of R.A.F. personnel from Burma by air and sea, with small parties by land, was completed without loss.</div> <bR> <div> 241. As regards stores, much valuable equipment was back loaded at the last moment from Rangoon. The majority of stores remaining in Burma were moved to the Lashio area, whence on the sudden and unexpected Japanese thrust in that region as much as possible was moved into China. The remainder was destroyed except for some large bombs which were rendered useless.</div> <bR> <div> 242. The task of supporting General Alexander's Army terminated on May 20th when- it was withdrawn to India. Air operations based in Eastern India continue against the Japanese in Burma.</div> <div>          </div> <DIV ALIGN="LEFT"></DIV> <div> <FONT SIZE="3" COLOR="#00FFFF" FACE="Arial" > </FONT><FONT SIZE="3" COLOR="#FFCC66" FACE="Arial" >back to</FONT><FONT SIZE="2" COLOR="#FFCC66" FACE="Arial" >  </FONT><A HREF="id99.htm" TARGET="_top" TITLE="THE RESEARCH ROOM"><U><B>THE RESEARCH ROOM</B></U></A></div> <bR> <bR> <bR> <div> <A HREF="id123_m.htm" TITLE="BURMA STEVENSON REPORT"><U><IMG SRC="22932320.gif" border=0 width="50" height="50" ALIGN="BOTTOM" HSPACE="0" VSPACE="0"></U></A><FONT SIZE="1" COLOR="#FFCC66" FACE="Arial" ><A HREF="id123_m.htm" TITLE="BURMA STEVENSON REPORT"><U> </U></A></FONT></div> <div> <A HREF="id123_m.htm" TITLE="BURMA STEVENSON REPORT"><U>BACK TO TOP</U></A></div> <bR> </td> </tr></table></body>