BURMA - STEVENSON REPORT

<body topmargin=0 leftmargin=0 marginheight=0 marginwidth=0> <table cellpadding=0 cellspacing=0 border=0><tr> <td valign="top" colspan=2 height=80 BGCOLOR="#000000" TEXT="#F7F7FF" bgproperties="fixed" background="0c200500dvldtc.gif"> <div> <FONT SIZE="5" COLOR="#FFCC66" FACE="BauerBodni BT" ><B>113 SQUADRON</B></FONT><FONT SIZE="1" COLOR="#FFFFCC" FACE="Arial" ><B>     |    </B></FONT><B> </B><A HREF="home_of_113_squadron.htm" TARGET="_top" TITLE="WELCOME"><U><B>HOME</B></U></A></div> <div> <B> </B><FONT SIZE="3" COLOR="#FFFFCC" FACE="Arial" >back to</FONT><FONT SIZE="2" COLOR="#FFFFCC" FACE="Arial" >  </FONT><FONT SIZE="2" COLOR="#00FFFF" FACE="Arial" ><A HREF="id99.htm" TARGET="_top" TITLE="THE RESEARCH ROOM"><U><B>THE RESEARCH ROOM</B></U></A></FONT></div> <div> </div> </td> </tr><tr> <td valign="top" width=215 BGCOLOR="#000000" TEXT="#F7F7FF" background="0c3d7c00dvldtc.gif"> <bR> <div> <A HREF="id121_m.htm#the_air_battle_" TARGET="TRLX_Middle" TITLE="BURMA STEVENSON REPORT"><U>THE AIR BATTLE</U></A></div> <div> <A HREF="id121_m.htm#fighting_tactics_" TARGET="TRLX_Middle" TITLE="BURMA STEVENSON REPORT"><U>FIGHTING TACTICS</U></A></div> <div> <A HREF="id121_m.htm#part_iv_the_land_battle_air_operations" TARGET="TRLX_Middle" TITLE="BURMA STEVENSON REPORT"><U>AIR OPS ARMY SUPPORT</U></A></div> <div> <A HREF="id121_m.htm#japanese_offensive_begins_" TARGET="TRLX_Middle" TITLE="BURMA STEVENSON REPORT"><U>JAP OFFENSIVE BEGINS</U></A></div> <div> <A HREF="id121_m.htm#action_at_kawkareik_" TARGET="TRLX_Middle" TITLE="BURMA STEVENSON REPORT"><U>ACTION AT KAWKAREIK</U></A></div> <div> <A HREF="id121_m.htm#the_action_on_the_bihn_" TARGET="TRLX_Middle" TITLE="BURMA STEVENSON REPORT"><U>ACTION AT BIHN</U></A></div> <div> <A HREF="id121_m.htm#the_battle_of_the_sittang_" TARGET="TRLX_Middle" TITLE="BURMA STEVENSON REPORT"><U>BATTLE OF SITTANG</U></A></div> <div> <A HREF="id121_m.htm#air_action_on_the_bilin_kyaikto_road_" TARGET="TRLX_Middle" TITLE="BURMA STEVENSON REPORT"><U>ATTACK BILIN KYAIKTO</U></A></div> <div> <A HREF="id121_m.htm#alleged_bombing_of_own_troops_" TARGET="TRLX_Middle" TITLE="BURMA STEVENSON REPORT"><U>BOMBING OF OWN TROOPS</U></A></div> <div> <A HREF="id121_m.htm#air_directif___abda_command_" TARGET="TRLX_Middle" TITLE="BURMA STEVENSON REPORT"><U>DIRECTIF ABDA COMMAND</U></A></div> <div> <A HREF="id121_m.htm#part_v___air_operations_covering_the" TARGET="TRLX_Middle" TITLE="BURMA STEVENSON REPORT"><U>EVAC OF RANGOON</U></A></div> <div> <A HREF="id121_m.htm#decision_to_organise_base_landing" TARGET="TRLX_Middle" TITLE="BURMA STEVENSON REPORT"><U>REORGANIZE WINGS</U></A></div> <div> <A HREF="id121_m.htm#136_" TARGET="TRLX_Middle" TITLE="BURMA STEVENSON REPORT"><U>KUTCHA STRIPS (ALG's)</U></A></div> <div> <A HREF="id121_m.htm#formation__of__x__wing_" TARGET="TRLX_Middle" TITLE="BURMA STEVENSON REPORT"><U>FORMATION OF X WING</U></A></div> <div> <A HREF="id121_m.htm#the_battle_of_pegu_" TARGET="TRLX_Middle" TITLE="BURMA STEVENSON REPORT"><U>BATTLE OF PEGU</U></A></div> <bR> </td> <td valign="top" height=400 BGCOLOR="#000000" TEXT="#F7F7FF"> <bR> <bR> <div> BURMA - AIR OPERATIONS</div> <div>  Jan 1st to May 22, 1942 </div> <div> STEVENSON REPORT</div> <bR> <div> PAGE 2<FONT SIZE="3" COLOR="#FFCC66" FACE="Arial" > </FONT></div> <bR> <div> <A HREF="id120.htm" TARGET="_top" TITLE="BURMA STEVENSON REPORT"><U>BACK</U></A><FONT SIZE="3" COLOR="#FFCC66" FACE="Arial" >        </FONT> <A HREF="id123.htm" TARGET="_top" TITLE="BURMA STEVENSON REPORT"><U>NEXT</U></A><FONT SIZE="3" COLOR="#FFCC66" FACE="Arial" > </FONT></div> <bR> <bR> <div> <U> <A NAME="the_air_battle_"><IMG BORDER="0" SRC="1x1.gif" HEIGHT="1" ALIGN="bottom" WIDTH="1" HSPACE="0" VSPACE="0" ></A></U><U>The Air Battle.</U></div> <bR> <div> 71. The air battle over Rangoon lasted from 23rd December, 1941, until 25th February 1942. The weight of enemy attack was directed intermittently against air bases at Rangoon with the object of destroying our growing fighter force and achieving air superiority over Rangoon to the point where it would be possible for him to undertake unrestricted day bombing operations o'n a destructive scale.</div> <bR> <div> 72. During this period of about 8 weeks, 31 day and night attacks were made—one in great weight. After sustaining serious losses—38 claimed destroyed—in the first 3 attacks terminating on the 4th January, the enemy resorted to night bombing, his scale of effort varying between 1 or 2 heavy bombers up to 16.</div> <bR> <div> 73. <I>Scale of attack brought to rest</I>—Between 23rd and 29th January a second attempt was made to, overwhelm our small fighter force, the enemy putting in a total of 218 plus— mostly fighters. In the air battle of those 6 days our fighter force claimed a total of some 50 enemy bombers and fighters destroyed He at once went back to night operations and continued these until his third and last, attempt to achieve air superiority over Rangoon on the 24th and 25th February. On those two days, when he put on a scale of attack of 166 bombers and fighters, he sustained the heavy loss of 37 fighters and bombers which were claimed destroyed with 7 probably destroyed. On the second" day, the 25th, the P.4o's of the A.V.G. claimed no less than 24 aircraft shot down. This terminated the air superiority battle over Rangoon. </div> <bR> <div> 74. <I>Such wastage had been inflicted on the enemy that thereafter he never attempted to enter our warning zone round Rangoon until the city was captured and the air bases in his hands.</I></div> <bR> <div> 75. <I>Result.</I>—This had a critical influence on the course of our-land operations and on the security of our convoys bringing in final reinforcements. These and the demolition of our oil and other interests in the port and the final evacuation by land or sea were completed without interference from enemy bomber or fighter aircraft.</div> <bR> <div> 76. Thus up to the last moment the P.40's of the A.V.G. and the Hurricane force were able to provide a state of absolute air superiority over this wide and vital area against a considerable weight of air attack.</div> <bR> <div> 77. <I>Conclusion.</I>—To sum -up on the air superiority battle over Rangoon, for a force of 1 Squadron of P.40s of the A.V.G., a half Squadron of Buffaloes and the equivalent of 2 'Squadrons, of Hurricanes commending to arrive in January and continuing to half-way through February, a claimed loss of <I>130 </I>enemy bombers and "fighters was inflicted on the enemy with 61 claimed as probably destroyed—the greater proportion falling to the guns of the A.-V.G. Counteroffensive action by our fighters and bombers to reduce the scale of attack had inflicted a loss of not less than 28 enemy aircraft destroyed on the ground, not counting those destroyed by our bombing attacks. Air superiority was achieved over Rangoon and maintained until it fell on 8th March. The A.V.G.—first in the field—fought with ready devotion and resolute gallantry. </div> <bR> <DIV ALIGN="LEFT"></DIV> <div> <U> <A NAME="fighting_tactics_"><IMG BORDER="0" SRC="1x1.gif" HEIGHT="1" ALIGN="bottom" WIDTH="1" HSPACE="0" VSPACE="0" ></A></U><U>Fighting Tactics.</U></div> <bR> <div> 78. In regard to the major tactics employed in the air battle over Rangoon, in the first place the warning was good. As long as the telephone lines remained in our hands the Burma Observer Corps provided this with high war efficiency. The R.D.F. set from Moulmein had been sited in Rangoon looking over the main avenue of enemy approach. Tihus enemy plots were accurate and frequent until the line of the Sittang was threatened.</div> <bR> <div> 79. <I>Fighter deployment.</I>—Fighters in the correct proportion could be deployed against the enemy scale of attack. The A.V.G. and the Hurricanes fought together. The Wing leader system was introduced. The pilots of the A.V.G. had considerable flying experience. Some of the pilots, particularly the leaders in the Hurricane force, had considerable war experience against the G.A.F. Consequently, the force fought well together. In the operations room there were two R/T. sets for the control of the air battle on different frequencies—one for the American fighters and one for the Hurricanes. </div> <bR> <div> 80. The general principles of fighting the airbattle were agreed between myself, the Wing leader and the Commander of the A.V.G. Pursuit Squadron, and the major tactics employed were those generally exercised in the Western theatre; the single point of -difference being that on account of the manoeuvrability of the Japanese fighter (which was the only advantage it had over our aircraft), the best method of attack was a dive, taking advantage of height and the sun, breaking away in a half roll or aileron turn before resuming position to carry out the attack again.</div> <bR> <div> 81. Enemy escorted bomber raids were met on first interception, the bombers were attacked with a suitable proportion of our forces while the fighters were attacked and drawn off by the remainder. Against the fighter formations of (say) • 40 to 60 plus, which so frequently appeared at height with the object of drawing up our fighters and shooting them down (before they got their height, the P.40s and the Hurricanes leant back on Rangoon and delivered their attack when the enemy fighters either lost height, with the object of carrying out a ground attack, or turned for home.</div> <bR> <div> 82. Throughout this air action from the 21st January onwards the fighter force in addition to defending Rangoon had also to meet its commitments over the battle area, providing security for our bombers and carrying out ground attacks on enemy concentrations in support of the Army.</div> <bR> <div> 83. <I>Night Fighting.</I>—As regards night bombing, there were no facilities for night interception. Although the enemy bombers were operating without flame dampers, and at first with navigation lights burning, the P-40's and Buffaloes were not able to intercept. On the arrival of the Hurricanes, trained in night fighting, however, some success was achieved. On the first night an enemy bomber was shot down in flames at 9,000 feet over the aerodrome at Mingaladon, the aircraft, with bombs, exploding close to the airfield. Two further successful night interceptions were made, both enemy aircraft being shot down in flames. With pilots at constant readiness throughout the hours of daylight, however, it was impossible in view of our limited resources to put the Hurricanes up each night.</div> <bR> <div> 84. I have no doubt that on moonlight nights —and the enemy bombed on no other — considerable success would have been obtained from the " fighter night " system, had Rangoon held.</div> <bR> <div> 85. <I>Assessment of Fighter Results. </I>— There was a little feeling in the A.V.G. on the assessment of results. Consequently I held a meeting with the A.V.G. Squadron Commander, and the Wing leader and Squadron Commanders, at which it was agreed that the standard of assessment should be that obtaining in Fighter Command at home. Colonel Chennault was informed. Combat reports by pilots were initialled by Squadron Commanders. The claim was then admitted. Previous claims by the A.V.G. for aircraft destroyed in the air were agreed at this meeting.</div> <bR> <bR> <div> <U> <A NAME="part_iv_the_land_battle_air_operations"><IMG BORDER="0" SRC="1x1.gif" HEIGHT="1" ALIGN="bottom" WIDTH="1" HSPACE="0" VSPACE="0" ></A></U><U>PART IV THE LAND BATTLE—AIR OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF THE ARMY IN TENASSERIM.</U></div> <bR> <div> 86. <I>Situation at Sea.</I>—After the fall of Singapore and Java the Japanese had command of the sea in these waters. There was no effective naval force of ours based in the Bay of Bengal. Thus the littoral of Burma was thereafter under the threat of sea-borne invasion unopposed by the Navy. Consequently, reinforcement by sea of the Japanese Army in Burma took place unmolested after the fall of Rangoon. This was a vital factor in the defence of Burma.</div> <bR> <div> 87. The Joint Commanders' Committee telegraphed on several occasions pressing for the provision of ships and material to provide some further local defence at least for the Port of Rangoon and for light craft to support our operations on the coast of the Gulf of Martaban and (Tenasserim. No ships were, however, available and none arrived—except those which escorted our convoys.</div> <bR> <div> 88. <I>The Land Situation. </I>— The land situation, which influenced air operations, has been fully described in the Despatches of Lieutenant- General Huttoh and General Alexander. It is not proposed further to remark on this except in so far as it is necessary in order to make clear the influence of air superiority fighting and bombing action on land operations and vice versa. I should, however, make the point that until Mergui and Tavoy fell on January 19th, I assumed the security of Burmese territory from attack by the Japanese Army based in. Thailand.</div> <bR> <div> 89. <I>Daily Planning of Close Support Operations. </I>— Bomber and fighter action in support of the Army during the land campaign up to the fall of Rangoon was decided each evening at a general staff and air staff Conference held at my Headquarters. General Hutton and I met morning and evening to agree joint action and review the changing situation. Subsequently, the programme was adjusted according to the requests made by the I7th (Indian) Division, to which an Air Liaison Officer had been attached. Communication was by W/T. and telephone. In general, the system worked satisfactorily.</div> <bR> <div> 90. <I>Tenasserim unsatisfactory for Bombing Operations.</I>—Close support bombing operations in the close jungle country in Tenasserim and to the East of the River Sittang was an unsatisfactory task for the R.A.F. At the request of the Army we undertook bombing operations in jungle country where it was impossible to see the enemy or to see our troops, — indeed difficult to see anything except the tops of the trees. In such circumstances not only is the objective not seen but it is impossible for navigators to pin -point their target with accuracy since there are no suitable land marks. The situation is made more difficult still by the knowledge in the mind of the crew that our positions were frequently outflanked by the enemy and therefore there was always the chance that our troops and the enemy were intermingled near the objective. When attempts were made to give bombing objectives in forest clearings, crews often found on arrival that such clearings were overgrown with scrub and consequently the same difficulties arose. As, however, our forward troops in the jungle on the Kawkareik position and during the battle of Tenasserim had reported the enemy's promiscuous bombing of the jungle to be effective and as-having considerable moral effect, I did not hesitate, while realising the risk to our own. troops of bombing in such densely wooded country, to continue the task in order to do our  best to help the Army.</div> <bR> <div> 91. Further obvious difficulties arose from the bombing point of view. For example, the enemy was frequently disguised in captured uniforms and native dress. This made recognition difficult. Moreover, they captured some of our transport during actions, while the native bullock carts, launches and private cars left behind and other vehicles were used freely. This made it difficult, and sometimes impossible, for crews to recognise the enemy in the open. Unsatisfactory, therefore, as the " bomb line " method was in such circumstances of cover, communications and moving battle, it had to be adopted as our primary security against the risks of attacking our own troops.</div> <bR> <div> 92 <I>First requirement</I>—<I>Army support.</I>—The fundamental requirement for the support of the Army in Tenasserim was the maintenance of air superiority over the Port of Rangoon, and the bases and supply depots in this vicinity. This secured the line of communication from serious bombing attack in the form and scale best calculated in this campaign to bring about a critical if not disastrous situation. Consequently I kept my small fighter force concentrated in the defence of Rangoon with the satisfactory results noted above.</div> <bR> <div> 93. <I>Security of Bombers and Fighter support for Army.</I>—From day to day, however, security for our bombers acting in support of the Army was necessary, since few as they were their destruction by enemy fighter action would have brought about a serious situation. Consequently, each day a careful appreciation of the air situation was made and a portion of the fighter force was thrown off from the Rangoon defence to undertake the Army support role. Indeed, when a particularly favourable ground target presented itself, I accepted the risk of an attack on Rangoon, and all fighters, with what bombers were available, were thrown in to support the land battle. The point here is that where the command of the fighters and bombers is undivided, such operations are practicable and close co-ordination between fighter and bomber operations can be readily achieved.</div> <bR> <div> 94. <I>Bombing of Bangkok.</I>—The aircraft and crews of 113 Squadron had arrived during the first week in January. The night of their arrival the enemy base at Bangkok, the main enemy base in Thailand, was-attacked by 10 low flying Blenheims. 11,000 lbs. of  bombs were dropped on the dock area in the centre of the town and fires were started. The Squadron was then withdrawn to Lashio to enable aircraft inspections to be carried out after its long desert flight. Owing to the shortage of tools and. spares, it was the 19th January before the Sauadron was in action again.</div> <bR> <DIV ALIGN="LEFT"></DIV> <div> <U> <A NAME="japanese_offensive_begins_"><IMG BORDER="0" SRC="1x1.gif" HEIGHT="1" ALIGN="bottom" WIDTH="1" HSPACE="0" VSPACE="0" ></A></U><U>JAPANESE OFFENSIVE BEGINS.</U></div> <div> <I><U>Mergui and Tavoy.</U></I></div> <bR> <div> 95. On the afternoon of the i8th January the situation at Mergui and Tavoy suddenly deteriorated and I was informed by the B.G.S. Burmarmy that instructions had been issued for the evacuation of Mergui. I accordingly ordered the withdrawal of our refuelling parties from both aerodromes, and as Tavoy was closely invested, an attempt was made to evacuate our detachments by air. On arrival of the aircraft the following morning the aerodrome was, however, in the hands of the enemy. Both detachments were safely evacuated by sea. </div> <bR> <DIV ALIGN="LEFT"></DIV> <div> <U> <A NAME="action_at_kawkareik_"><IMG BORDER="0" SRC="1x1.gif" HEIGHT="1" ALIGN="bottom" WIDTH="1" HSPACE="0" VSPACE="0" ></A></U><U>Action at Kawkareik.</U></div> <bR> <div> 96. Concurrently with this, reconnaissance beyond the Kawkareik position on the track through Mesoht and Raheng had disclosed some, but not unusual activity. We had also destroyed a number of enemy bombers and fighters on both these forward landing grounds. The country was densely covered with ]ungle and unsuitable for air action since movement on the ground could not be seen from the air.</div> <bR> <div> 97. On the 20th the enemy commenced their attack on the Kawkareik position. Air action in support of the troops holding this position was difficult, since no clear picture of the whereabouts of the enemy or our own troops was, possible. Accordingly the enemy forward landing, ground and base depots at Mesoht was attacked by bombers and fighters. Two enemy aircraft were destroyed on the aerodrome. Reconnaissance was carried out over this position and towards Tavoy in the .South with the object of locating our own troops and the enemy.</div> <bR> <div> 98. The withdrawal from the Kawkareik position to Moulmein took place on the 22nd January. On the 21st and 22nd the Blenheims attacked Raheng aerodrome and village and Mesarieng, dropping some 6,000 Ibs. of bombs on each raid. Fighter escort was provided with the object of clearing the air for short periods over the Army front and providing support for the bomber operations. Moulmein was bombed by a strong formation of enemy escorted bombers which was intercepted by the escort of our bomber raid on its outward journey—an occasion on which our attempt to choose the right time proved correct. Seven enemy bombers and 9 fighters were destroyed in this air action. Reconnaissance was continued over the battle area.</div> <bR> <bR> <DIV ALIGN="LEFT"></DIV> <div> <U>The Action at Moulmein</U></div> <bR> <div> 99. On the 3Oth January the Japanese attacked Moulmein. Our forces were disposed holding Moulmein and the right bank of the Salween from Pa'an, southwards, with one Brigade in the Bilin area. During the period between the 23rd January and the 3oth, frequent low visual reconnaissance by fighters was carried out covering the~ battle area and the coast of Tenasserim together with Japanese lines of communication. Information obtained, however, was sketchy owing to the nature of the country and the fact that, in open -country, the enemy lay close in the day time and moved by night. Our available bomber force—an average of about 6 a day—with the aid of such fighters as could be spared from the defence of Rangoon, acted in support of our land forces in the area.</div> <bR> <div> 100. Our bombers and fighters attacked enemy aerodromes, M.T., and the enemy line of communication, through Kawkareik, Myawaddy and Mesoht, while the enemy main base at Bangkok was attacked again on the nights of the 24th, 27th and 28th. In these operations a total of 42,100 Ibs. of bombs were dropped.</div> <bR> <div> 101. Limited escort to our ships coming into Rangoon, anti-submarine patrols and G.R. reconnaissance in the Gulf of Martaban were carried out from day to day.</div> <bR> <div> 102. The fighter support which was provided over the Army forward positions each day on a limited scale had accounted for at least 7 aircraft shot down and 13 damaged (to end of January). Our losses were slight.</div> <bR> <div> 103. The main objective of the Japanese air force, outside the Rangoon area, during this period, was Moulmein, which was attacked on 7 occasions between the 3rd and 22nd January. The first attack was carried out by 9 fighters, and the later ones toy ibomibers, in pairs by night, and in formations up to 27 in number by day with fighter escorts of up to 15 aircraft, the chief target being the aerodrome.</div> <bR> <DIV ALIGN="LEFT"></DIV> <div> <U> <A NAME="the_action_on_the_bihn_"><IMG BORDER="0" SRC="1x1.gif" HEIGHT="1" ALIGN="bottom" WIDTH="1" HSPACE="0" VSPACE="0" ></A></U><U>The Action on the Bihn.</U></div> <bR> <div> 104. From the 30th January until the I5th February, when the I7th Division took up a line on the Bilin River, all available bombers were employed in direct Army support with the maximum number of fighters it was practicable to spare each day. Bombing operations took the form of support to our hard pressed detachments. Attacks were made on river craft on the River Salween and off Moulmein with both bombers and fighters. The fighter effort available was employed in attempting to intercept at this great distance from its base the enemy raids on our forward positions, and providing security for our bombing operations During this period river craft, batteries, enemy concentrations, troops, landing stages, railway stations and barracks and stores were attacked. A total weight of 70,136 Ibs. of bombs were dropped on these objectives, with successful results. Most of the bombing was carried out from a low altitude and, in consequence, the results could be seen, provided objectives were not in the jungle. The raids were carried out on such places as Kado, Martaban, Pa'an, 'Moulmein, Minzi, Heinze, the Thaton Road and the Dunzeik Road. The fighter effort diverted from the Rangoon defence in support of the Army and bombing operations was usually from 6 to 12 per day and 'sometimes sorties were repeated. </div> <bR> <div> 105. During this period the Japanese air force continued night activity against Rangoon on a small scale up to the 8th February. Daylight operations, apart from support of their land forces, comprised 4 attacks on Toungoo aerodrome by raids of 6 to 15 bombers on the 3rd and 4th February. From the 8th to the I2th enemy bombers attacked our troops between Pa'an and Thaton, but generally with little effect. </div> <bR> <bR> <DIV ALIGN="LEFT"></DIV> <div> <U> <A NAME="the_battle_of_the_sittang_"><IMG BORDER="0" SRC="1x1.gif" HEIGHT="1" ALIGN="bottom" WIDTH="1" HSPACE="0" VSPACE="0" ></A></U><U>The Battle of the Sittang.</U></div> <bR> <div> 106. The withdrawal to the Bilin River commenced on the I5th February, and this position was attacked by the Japanese on the 17th. On the 18th the River had been crossed and the "withdrawal to the Sittang position commenced. On the 22nd our forces had reached the right "bank of the Sittang.</div> <bR> <div> 107. During this period air operations continued at the maximum intensity practicable in support of the Army. The air battle of Rangoon still continued. With the loss of Moulmein we lost our forward air base in this area. Consequently, air operations, both fighter and bomber, were carried out from the main air base at Rangoon. Furthermore, with the capture of territory by the enemy, our warning system in Tenasserim was rapidly rolled up. Now warning of the approach of enemy raids over Tenasserim was impossible. For the deience of Rangoon we still had observer posts to the East of Rangoon, while our R.D.F. set provided some warning. But the interception of enemy aircraft supporting the Japanese Army was impracticable unless such attacks took place when our fighters were present over the line.</div> <bR> <div> 108. The Supreme Commander, General Sir Archibald Wavell, visited the command during the last week of January and on the 5th February. At these meetings I explained the air situation and our urgent need for reinforcements, particularly the acceleration of the 2 reinforcing Hurricane Squadrons which had been promised and for an allocation of 24 Hurricanes per month from the flow. As regards bombers, I asked for 2 further reinforcing Blenheim Squadrons, for 16 Blenheims to equip 60 Squadron and for 12 Blenheims a month from ABDA Command flow of maintenance aircraft, and additionally for the Mohawks to re-equip the 2 Lysander Squadrons. General Wavell said that he would do what he could to meet these requirements, but explained the pressing need for air support in Malaya and the N.E I.</div> <bR> <div> 109. During rife' period i6tih to 23rd February the maximum effort that could be put forward by the bombers was 102 sorties, in which 89,992 Ibs. of bombs were released in low flying attacks on the enemy, accompanied by machine gun fire. Such objectives as the railway station at Moulmein, troop concentrations and M.T., river traffic and aerodromes were bombed. Direct hits on such things as trains and paddle steamers in Sittang were observed. Fighter support for the Army and the security of our bombers continued.</div> <bR> <bR> <DIV ALIGN="LEFT"></DIV> <div> <U> <A NAME="air_action_on_the_bilin_kyaikto_road_"><IMG BORDER="0" SRC="1x1.gif" HEIGHT="1" ALIGN="bottom" WIDTH="1" HSPACE="0" VSPACE="0" ></A></U><U>Air Action on the Bilin-Kyaikto Road.</U></div> <bR> <div> 110. For the first time in the campaign the enemy provided a satisfactory bombing target. On the 21st an enemy column of some 300 or more vehicles, ox-carts and M.T. was reported on the road between Bilin and Kyaikto. The " bomb line " ran North and South through Kyaikto. The total fighter effort of the Rangoon defence and what bombers were at readiness were ordered to attack at 16.25 hours.  The first sortie off was one of 12 P 40’s at 16.30, closely followed by 8 Hurricanes at 16.40. A total of 38 fighter sorties and 8 Blenheim sorties were engaged in the attack. Direct hits were reported on M T. and horse transport accompanied by many fires. The village of Kyaikto through which the column was passing was also set on fire. At 16.25 hours the Army Headquarters moved the " bomb line " to a line running North and South 2 miles West of Kyaikto.</div> <bR> <div> 111 The enemy had during the afternoon of the 21st penetrated through the village of Kyaikto and moved along the road running North to Kimmun. That afternoon their infantry were seen by the Duke of Wellingtons West of this road (and North of the Kyaikto Road). Their thrust that night at the Sittang Bridge took place up this roadi when they worked round our left flank and attacked the Bridge in the rear of  the 16th and 46th Brigades. It is evident that although our air attack in some weight on the enemy's main column could not have entirely prevented his attack from developing, it must have reduced its scale and intensity.</div> <bR> <DIV ALIGN="LEFT"></DIV> <div> <U> <A NAME="alleged_bombing_of_own_troops_"><IMG BORDER="0" SRC="1x1.gif" HEIGHT="1" ALIGN="bottom" WIDTH="1" HSPACE="0" VSPACE="0" ></A></U><U>Alleged bombing of own Troops.</U></div> <bR> <div> 112. There was an incident reported on this day and remarked upon in Army reports. It is alleged that our troops at Mokpalin were bombed and machine gunned by some Blenheim aircraft between 12.00 and 15.00 hours. The facts are that at the request of Army Headquarters 8 Blenheims bombed Kawbein (near Bilin) in the morning and landed back at their base after mid-day. After an exhaustive enquiry, in which I have taken the opinion both of Officers who were in the air and on the ground, I have failed to reach a firm conclusion that our aircraft did, in fact, bomb our own troops at this time and place. The enquiry is complicated by such statements as " the attacking aircraft were identified by roundels on the underside of their wings "-our Blenheims have roundels on the upper side of the wing but certainly not on the underside, and the possibility that the Japanese used captured Blenheims during this campaign should be. considered. There is, moreover, a great similarity between the plan silhouette of the Japanese Army 97 medium bomber and the Blenheim, and there must have been a number of enemy bombers flying over Mokpalin about this time because the enemy effort was concentrated on the Sittang area, a few miles to the West of Mokpalin. Since, however, the country between the Rivers Sittang and Bilin is closely covered in jungle, I consider it not improbable that some crews by mistake may have bombed the wrong objective. The enemy effort reached on this day a total of  90 fighters and 12 bombers in action in the Sittang area. The Sittang Bridge was the scene of the heaviest attacks.</div> <bR> <div> 113. In the meantime, Mandalay had its first attack by 10 bombers on the I9th.</div> <bR> <div> 114 <I>G.R. Escort for Shipping.--Such </I>escort to shipping, G R. reconnaissance and coastwise search in the Gulf of Martaban as was practicable was.carried out with the slim effort available. Fighter support against bomber attack was provided once our convoys carne in range.</div> <bR> <div> 115. To extend the range of our reconnaissance for this purpose and to give forewarning of enemy naval movements in the direction of the Andaman Islands it was decided to locate reconnaissance aircraft at Port .Blair. The construction of a landing- ground in the Andaman Islands presented some difficulty, but after considerable work it was possible to construct a runway of 800 yards at Port Blair. The only type of reconnaissance aircraft available that could be operated from such a base was the Lysander and 2 of these aircraft were fitted with long range tanks and flown over escortedby Hudsons on the nth February. These aircraft were able to carry out reconnaissance until the Andamans were evacuated.</div> <bR> <div> 116. Daily coastal reconnaissance was also carried out throughout the campaign against possible Japanese attempts to attack our Army by landing, behind them. Such an attack did happen on one occasion — at night.</div> <bR> <div> 117. This concludes the air operations carried out in support of the Army in Tenasserim.</div> <bR> <bR> <DIV ALIGN="LEFT"></DIV> <div> <U> <A NAME="air_directif___abda_command_"><IMG BORDER="0" SRC="1x1.gif" HEIGHT="1" ALIGN="bottom" WIDTH="1" HSPACE="0" VSPACE="0" ></A></U><U>Air Directif </U><U>— </U><U>ABDA Command.</U></div> <bR> <div> 118. On the 17th January air directif 0087 from Headquarters, South Western Pacific, was issued to Norgroup. This gave our primary tasks as: —</div> <div> <I>(a) </I>To secure the arrival of reinforcements and to protect the Port of Rangoon, and</div> <div> <I>(b) To </I>reduce the scale of air attack on Malaya. Subsequent directifs received from ABDA Command related more to the battle in the South Western Pacific than to operations that could be based in Burma.</div> <bR> <bR> <DIV ALIGN="LEFT"></DIV> <div> <U> <A NAME="part_v___air_operations_covering_the"><IMG BORDER="0" SRC="1x1.gif" HEIGHT="1" ALIGN="bottom" WIDTH="1" HSPACE="0" VSPACE="0" ></A></U><U>PART V — AIR OPERATIONS COVERING THE EVACUATION OF RANGOON.</U></div> <bR> <div> 119. In February it seemed to me that the troops available in Burma might be unable to hold the country against the form and scale of land attack which the Japanese were exerting through Tenasserim. This question was discussed in the Joint Commanders' Committee on several occasions. Our forward air bases at Mergui and Tavoy had fallen. The Moulmein airfields had been captured. Our warning system East of the Sittang was in enemy hands.</div> <bR> <div> 120. At this time the fighter force and bomber squadrons building up in Burma comprised the only Allied air force between the Japanese and India, indeed between the Japanese and Middle East. Had we had time to establish and consolidate the forces in .passage from the U.K. and Middle East comprising personnel, equipment, maintenance and warning system, there would have been a good chance of presenting a firm front to the enemy air force with their inferior equipment. On the other hand, if the Port of Rangoon fell into enemy hands in March or April, the flow would stop, and there was a grave possibility that our air force might well be destroyed piece-meal in Burma before it was strong enough and had time to organise. Such a defeat in detail could be of no help to the Army in Burma and would uncover India at a critical time.</div> <bR> <div> 121. The question therefore arose as to whether plans should not be prepared to prevent the annihilation of our force by moving our base to India and providing it with strong mixed Whigs in Burma maintained from India. Thus dispersed, air support could be given to the Army in Burma and bombers based in India could support operations in Burma. Such action, moreover, would contribute to the air defence of India in her critical and naked sector.</div> <bR> <div> 122. On the I2th February I therefore telegraphed ABDA Command, A 677 of 12/2, indicating that in the unlikely event of the loss of Rangoon administrative plans might be necessary to enable fighter equipment to be withdrawn, and requesting a directif as to whether the R.A.F. units should proceed with, the Army North towards China or whether they should proceed in the direction of India for the defence of Calcutta and North Eastern India. I pointed out that if they were withdrawn to the North there was no adequate warning on the airfield line Toungoo- Heho - Namsang-Lashio and that the forces there located would therefore be open to fighter attack without warning, when on the  ground. If withdrawn to Calcutta they could provide a strong defence. R.D.F.. cover could be provided. Once separated from Rangoon (the only point through which maintenance for an air force could pass) the force instead of building up to its planned size would become a wasting force. In China there were few or no facilities for operating our bombers and fighters, whereas with lay-back bases in India and forward bases and strong detachments in Northern Burma, bomber and fighter action in support of the Army could continue. No reply was received to this telegram.</div> <bR> <div> 123. On 15th February Singapore fell.</div> <bR> <div> 124. On the i8th February, General Hutton sent off his telegram 0.749 of 18/2 which indicated the possibility that the enemy might penetrate the line of the Sittang and that the evacuation of Rangoon might become an imminent possibility. Consequently, in view of' this serious situation, I telegraphed my appreciation in which I set out the factors of the air situation and indicated three courses of action. Firstly, to remain with the Army during the move northwards towards China. In these circumstances the JR.A.F. units would have become a wasting force, since maintenance would be difficult if not impossible once Rangoon had fallen, while heavy losses for small return would be inevitable in the event of reinforced enemy scale of attack. Secondly; to withdraw the air force to India when Rangoon was closely threatened. The final course was to leave a mixed force of I Hurricane Squadron, 1 Blenheim Flight and 1 Army Co-operation Flight, withdrawing the remainder of the force to India. No reply was received to this telegram.*</div> <bR> <div> 125. On the 20th February instructions were given for the withdrawal of the iyth Division behind the River Sittang. A meeting was held at Government House at which General Hutton and I were present. The G.O.C. stated that he had instructed the Commander of the l7th Division to fall back behind the Sittang <I>, </I>He outlined the steps that he proposed to take in this situation in regard to commencing the evacuation scheme of Rangoon and the establishment of Rear Headquarters at Maymyo</div> <bR> <div> 126. Our Rangoon air bases were closely threatened. The warning facilities except for limited R.D.F. and Observer Corps observation had practically gone., As a result of this meeting the G.O.C despatched his telegram 0.792 of 20/2.</div> <bR> <bR> <DIV ALIGN="LEFT"></DIV> <div> <U> <A NAME="decision_to_organise_base_landing"><IMG BORDER="0" SRC="1x1.gif" HEIGHT="1" ALIGN="bottom" WIDTH="1" HSPACE="0" VSPACE="0" ></A></U><U>Decision to organise base landing grounds in India with mixed Wings in Burma.</U></div> <bR> <div> 127. I therefore (telegraphed HeadquartersABDA Command indicating the situation described at this meeting. There was no time to be lost. General Hutton agreed with me that the only course open to us to maintain our effort in support of the Army in Burma—once our airfields and warning at Rangoon had been lost—was to establish base landing grounds in India, operational landing grounds at Akyab and Magwe with advanced landing grounds in the Rangoon area to provide what fighter and bomber support could be given. Failing immediate instructions to the contrary, I proposed in my telegram putting this plan into action.</div> <bR> <div> 128. Arrangements were (accordingly made to leave a mixed Wing one Hurricane Squadron, one Blenheim Squadron and half an Army Co-operation Squadron, organised as a 'mixed Wing, with one Squadron of the A.V.G. in Upper Burma, based at Magwe, one mixed Wing of one Hurricane Squadron, one Bomber Squadron and one G.R. Squadron at Akyab and to build up and feed these two Wings from a base organisation in India.</div> <bR> <div> 129. The decision .which set the size of the Wing left at Magwe was based on the amount of maintenance dn the country on the 20th February. It was calculated by the staff that there was sufficient maintenance in this mixed Wing for a period of three months. As regards Akyab, access by sea was still open and maintenance therefore would be satisfactory. There was no overland communication between Magwe and Akyab. The route from India in the North down the Manipur Road had not been completed.</div> <bR> <div> 130. The decision to Ibase the force in Northern Burma at Magwe was made because it lay behind two lines of observer corps telephone lines, one down the Valley of the Salween towards Rangoon and the other down the Valley of the Irrawaddy. It was proposed TO attempt to evacuate the R.D.F. set if Rangoon fell. By this means it was hoped to provide sufficient warning at Magwe to secure the base against anything but the heaviest scale of attack. Since Singapore had fallen on the I5th February 'the weight of the Japanese air force could now be turned towards Burma. I therefore expected that if Rangoon fell, with the considerable number of airfields now prepared in the Rangoon area, heavy reinforcement of Japanese aircraft" would be flown in at iwill to Burma. The enemy would have control of the communications and the free use of 'the Port of Rangoon and thus a large air force could be maintained.</div> <bR> <div> 131. I received no reply to my telegram.* Action was commenced. ' I had received a personal telegram from Air Headquarters, India on the 19th in which-the A.O.C. in C. informed me that if the necessity arose he had prepared a plan for the withdrawal of my force to India. On the 20th we requested air transport to be flown to Magwe, whence it would work a shuttle service between Magwe and Akyab. Onward transport of personnel from Akyaib would be by sea. The personnel to be evacuated numbered some 3,000, the majority of whom were in the Rangoon area. A proportion were moved by sea, the remainder by air.</div> <bR> <div> 132. On the 2ist the Postmaster General reported to me 'that the telephone system in Rangoon would cease 'functioning at. 18.00 hours that day. Except, therefore, for our single R.D.F. set—worn-out and of the wrong kind—there would be no warning for the defence of Rangoon and our airfields. Arrangements were at once made toyman the observer centre in the Central Telegraph Office with R.A.F. personnel. This limited warning continued until within a few days of the fall of Rangoon.</div> <bR> <div> 133. Beyond the general statement by the Army that in the event of the evacuation of Rangoon they would proceed to the North and generally in the direction of China, there was always the element of doubt as to whether they would proceed to China or fall back towards the Manipur Road and so towards India. Rear Headquarters had been established at Maymyo and stocks were being back-loaded up country to the Mandalay-Maymyo area. The initial line of withdrawal, I had always been informed, would be along the Prome Road, a road 150 miles in length. *</div> <bR> <div> 134. Our air bases in general lay on the other main route to the North—up a Valley of 'the Sittang. The main railway system ran through this Valley to Mandalay and branched to Myitkyina in the North, and Lashio in the N.E. The Burma Road lay along the same route to Mandalay and Lashio.</div> <bR> <div> 135. In consequence, from the air point of view the Prome route was unsatisfactory since there were no air Ibases of any kind of withdrawal between Rangoon and Mandalay' suitable for the operation of modern fighters and bombers with high wing loading—except Magwe, and that had no accommodation, no pens and no 'dispersal. Indeed the only other aerodromes were at Myitkyina, 600 miles to the North (runway incomplete) and Meiktila—our depot of the future—where a runway was finished. But Meiktila was rather too much to the North and East to be effective in the initial stages and had only slight warning facilities.</div> <bR> <div>  <A NAME="136_"><IMG BORDER="0" SRC="1x1.gif" HEIGHT="1" ALIGN="bottom" WIDTH="1" HSPACE="0" VSPACE="0" ></A>136. I had foreseen the possibility of having to operate my mixed fighter and bomber effort in what might well be—and later proved to be—a tense situation, in which the Army would be attempting to withdraw along this single line of communication. There would 'be no opportunity of dispersing off the road and no cover from air attack. Accordingly, I had a series of strips cut into the hard paddy land along this line of communication and on the 1st March, when the C.-in-C., India, visited Rangoon, I was able to report that I was prepared to operate on this route.</div> <bR> <div> 137. But operating a numerically inferior force from such landing grounds against a weight of air attack without adequate warning was a risky and fortuitous operation. Thus I had grave doubts about our ability to maintain ourselves in being. But when and if this situation arose we should have done our best to secure the Army against enemy air action.</div> <bR> <div> 138. Against this threat, therefore, the location of our " kutcha " strips had been kept as secret as possible and a very useful number had been prepared in the vicinity of Mingaladon and towards the North and West up the Irrawaddy to Prome.</div> <bR> <div> 139. At night all first-line aircraft, bombers and fighters, were flown off the parent airfields at Mingaladon and Zayatkwin to " kutcha " strips. Thus the location of our fighting force, when based on" such temporary airfields, was not readily obvious to the enemy. Pilots and air crews were motored into their accqmmodation. They arrived at the " kutcha " strip before dawn the next morning to fly their aircraft. This we found the only method of ensuring secrecy of the strips and the security of equipment from, the damage caused by night bombing. With large numbers of small bombs the enemy's night ibombing of Mingaladon was accurate and effective. If Rangoon were to be evacuated when the warning had entirely gone, I proposed to /guard the security of my fighters by the use of these strips, and evacuate the parent airfields. The bombers on account of their range could operate from Magwe and refuel and rearm in the forward area, but the fighters with an extreme fighting range of 135 miles would have to be brought back along the Prome Road in steps of some 50 miles so that security could be provided for our retiring columns.</div> <bR> <div> 140. All preparations practicable were made <I>"to </I>improve the warning system at Akyab and Magwe, but with the time and resources available this proved to be a hopeless task Furthermore, much work was necessary at Magwe to make it a satisfactory base, and labour was difficult to get. The .provision of satellite " kutcha " strips was, however, undertaken to provide 'dispersion. Magwe, although it had a runway still under construction, had been a. civil "air port and, since it lay in the back area of Burma/was not intended in the general plan to be an operational aerodrome. Antiblast protection in the way of pens or dispersal arrangements had not been started. Had, for example, Toungoo been situated where Magwe was, it would have been a different story and the situation in regard to P.A.D. measures would have been much more satisfactory for the operation of a mixed Wing.</div> <bR> <div> 141. Final preparations to continue to fight the battle over Rangoon, and for the withdrawal to the North, were taken in hand at once. Rear Headquarters was opened up at Magwe on 22nd February with forward Headquarters in Rangoon.</div> <bR> <DIV ALIGN="LEFT"></DIV> <div> <U> <A NAME="formation__of__x__wing_"><IMG BORDER="0" SRC="1x1.gif" HEIGHT="1" ALIGN="bottom" WIDTH="1" HSPACE="0" VSPACE="0" ></A></U><U>Formation' of " X " Wing.</U></div> <bR> <div> 142. To control the fighter action and the bombing offensive action in support of the Army throughout this phase, I formed an " X " Wing Headquarters under the command of Group Captain Noel Singer, D.S.O., D.F-C., with a strong staff, reasonable communications, and good mobility. The role of " X " Wing was to maintain air superiority over Rangoon until the demolitions of the oil interests at Syriam and Thilawa, the docks, power stations,munitions and stores had been completed and until the Army had withdrawn from the area and thereafter to provide air superiority over the area in which the Army was moving, until it reached Prome.</div> <bR> <div> 143. The detachments on Toungoo, Heho, Namsang and Lashio would continue in operation to enable limited air action to take place in support of the Chinese, while a landing ground was'' prepared at Mandalay to serve Rear Headquarters at Maymyo A scheme was drawn up to enable detachments to be withdrawn 'from forward aerodromes should the situation necessitate—with preparations for the evacuation of equipment, stores, etc. Arrangements had been made with Army Headquarters that in these circumstances all petrol and oil.would be handed over to the Army for the use of the Armoured Brigade and M.T. columns.</div> <bR> <div> 144. On the 23rd February the Sittang Bridge was blown. Except on the days on which the enemy had thrown the weight of his attack against the Rangoon defence, his bombers andfighters flew over their forward troops advancing through the jungle. Air action was carried' out against our troops intermittently on most days. As explained previously, we did the best with the slim fighter resources available tosupport the Army in this respect</div> <bR> <div> 145. On the next two days, the 24th and 25th, the final attack was made by the Japanese Air Force on the Rangoon defence system with the object of attaining air superiority over the area. As noted elsewhere, this failed in a signal manner and severe casualties were inflicted on. the enemy. Thereafter, until the fall of Rangoon, his fighter force was occupied purely defensively over the area in which his advance was taking place, formations of up to 40 plus, operating each day. When possible, therefore, in order to keep them on the defensive, bombing operations were carried out in the area in which the enemy fighters were working. We attempted to make interceptions but with no great success, since their fighter effort was onlyover the area of operations at certain times. On. the 23rd, however, a message was received from the 17th Division and interception did takeplace in which 2 enemy aircraft were shot down. </div> <bR> <div> 146. Our fighter effort which had built up to no less than 44—Hurricanes and P.40's - on the 17th February, dwindled away after the air battle on the 24th and 25'th and after our air operations over Tenasserim to a low mark of under 10 on the 28th February, due to the lack of maintenance, spares and the number that were " shot up " in the air battle. The figure, however, gradually increased again to 27 on: the 4th March, but fell to an average of about 17 aircraft from this date until the loth March.</div> <bR> <div> 147. As regards bombers, the effort built up to 16 on the I7th February and fell away during the battles in Tenasserim to a low mark of under 5 on the 25th February for exactly the same reasons as described above. It built up, however, to 12 aircraft on the 28th February and to an average of about 10 serviceable from that time until the loth March.</div> <bR> <DIV ALIGN="LEFT"></DIV> <div> <U> <A NAME="the_battle_of_pegu_"><IMG BORDER="0" SRC="1x1.gif" HEIGHT="1" ALIGN="bottom" WIDTH="1" HSPACE="0" VSPACE="0" ></A></U><U>The Battle of Pegu.</U></div> <bR> <div> 148. On the 23rd February I visited the I7th Division at Pegu with General Hutton. The Armoured Brigade had now arrived and was mostly deployed in this area. The enemy used the hours of darkness to cross the Sittang: and pressure was exerted against our forces at Waw on the 26th February. Between this time and the 5th March the battle developed.</div> <bR> <div> 149. On the 4th March General Alexander arrived at Magwe. He flew down with me to Rangoon. I accompanied him on his visit with General Hutton to the 17th Division at Pegu. The enemy had engaged our forces round Pegu and an infiltration in strength, accompanied by light tanks, had taken place to the North through the jungle country of the lower Pegu Yomas in the direction of the Prome Road— our line of communication. This movement</div> <bR> <DIV ALIGN="LEFT"></DIV> <div> <A HREF="id123.htm" TARGET="_top" TITLE="BURMA STEVENSON REPORT"><U>NEXT</U></A></div> <bR> <bR> <div> <A HREF="id121_m.htm" TITLE="BURMA STEVENSON REPORT"><U><IMG SRC="22932320.gif" border=0 width="50" height="50" ALIGN="BOTTOM" HSPACE="0" VSPACE="0"></U></A><FONT SIZE="1" COLOR="#FFCC66" FACE="Arial" ><A HREF="id121_m.htm" TITLE="BURMA STEVENSON REPORT"><U> </U></A></FONT></div> <div> <A HREF="id121_m.htm" TITLE="BURMA STEVENSON REPORT"><U>BACK TO TOP</U></A></div> <bR> </td> </tr></table></body>