Hi Ho, Hi Ho, It's Off To Hell We Go.....
THE MIDDLE AND FAR EAST - WW2
The date for Wavell`s secret offensive was set for December 9th and he hastily prepared for it under growing fears that Hitler would come to Mussolini`s aid and perhaps greater fear he would continue to be robbed of men for other theatres. In the meantime, to soften the Italians Wavell sent long range bombers from Malta and the Suez Canal area to bomb airfields, ports and communication lines.
On the 28th October Mussolini invaded Greece much to the chagrin of Hitler and Churchill. As Germany is not at war with Greece yet the Germans are reputed to be on the docks taking notes as the Brittish come to the rescue, indeed both Brittish and German planes were sharing the same airstrips . An absurd irony Wavell also had to contend with in Egypt.
Note that Wavell in his despatch to Secretary of State Eden December 1940, makes reference to the fact that Egypt, although the main British base of operations for the Middle East, was ironically a country not at war. As such there were large numbers of enemy subjects still at large and he states he was in continual close contact with the Embassy. Aside from being an interesting irony, it gives some indication of the sureal setting of this theatre and the impossibility of keeping any kind of secret. In light of this Wavell went to great lengths to make his offensive plans to appear as routine exercises.
In a different theatre further East in the Sudan and Italian East Africa, the British were not doing so well and in a November 6th attack to recapture the British post of Gallabat 6 RAF fighters were lost, effectively handing air superiority to the Italians. As a result the British ground forces, with virtually no cover, suffered heavy casualties from bombing but did re-take the Post despite this.
The plan for the British attack was daring. Graziani now had 80,000 strong spread over a fifty mile front in a series of fortified camps which were separated by wide distances. Lt General Sir Richard OConner`s Western Desert force was to penetrate the 20 mile gap between the enemy`s right flank at Sofafi and his next camp (Maletti Group) at Nibeiwa. Once through they would turn towards the sea circling back and attack Nibeiwa camp and the Tummar camps from the rear. The 7th armoured division would advance towards Buq Buq to prevent reinforcements from reaching the armies under attack*. Meanwhile the 4th Indian Division, the 16th Infantry Brigade and a composite force from the garrison at Mersa Matruh under Brigadier Selby would lead a secondary attack on both the Sofafi camp and the Meiktila camp on the coast.
*In Churchills version of the plan the 7th armoured stayed with the 4th and 16th Brigade, and he is not clear as to who cut communications at BuqBuq but it was in fact at least a section of the 7th. A later comment by Churchill in support of the 7th states: "I remember being struck by a message from a young officer in a tank of the 7th Armoured Division, "Have arrived at the second B in Bug Bug".
Churchill was delighted with the plan, in his own words, "Here was something worth doing! The war cabinet is to give immediate sanction and all possible support to this splendid enterprise and among our many other competing needs it should have first claim upon our strained resources." (This however, he wrote years after the fact and while he likely was delighted with the plan, his "first claim to resources" remark is not borne out by his actions or telegrams of the time.)
Insert map of offensive positions
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