CHAPTERS
BACKGROUND- THE PLAYERS
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Hi Ho, Hi Ho, It's Off To Hell We Go.....
THE MIDDLE AND FAR EAST - WW2
It is June 1940, air raid sirens wail over London, the Germans have rolled across all of Europe driving the British forces into the sea. The horror of Dunkirk, its beaches still red, is now part of history. France is all but lost, and with the invasion of it`s homeland imminent, Britan is now alone. To this ominous backdrop, and barely the resources to defend it`s home, Britan must now rise to the defense of Egypt and soon the whole of the Middle and Far East. The cry for more men and material comes from every corner.
THE MIDDLE EAST - 1940
Regardless of the limited resources and need to protect the home front, the British war cabinet is adamant that Egypt will be defended with what ever it can muster. Getting the supplies there however, was entirely another matter! Airchief, Sir Arthur Longmore in Cairo was responsible for protecting the sea route through the Mediterranean to the Suez Canal connecting the Red Sea . Through this, the critical shipping of men and material from Britan to the far East sailed to avoid having to take the only other passage, which is all the way to the bottom of Africa, around the Cape of Good Hope and all the way back up through the Indian Ocean to the southern entrance of the Red Sea. Italy`s entry into the war presented a serious threat to this route both because of it`s geographical position and because of their military presence in Cyrenaica and East Africa. When the Admiralty declared themselves unable to pass even "military" convoys through the Medierranean any longer, Churchill laments "all must go round the Cape, thus we might easily rob the battle of Britan without helping the battle of Egypt. This simple statement sums up well the dilemma faced by the War cabinet.
THE WESTERN DESERT The enormous logistical problems of fighting a war in a remote area far from home was only bested by the fact that this was also the most inhospitable climate on earth. Water was a commodity rationed as if it were gold, the lack of which took it's toll in lives and was a major factor influencing nearly every action and decision. For many, the high point of leave was not wine, women and song, it was taking a long luxurious bath in water that had not been shared with thirty of their comrades. Indeed if you read through the letters sent home you will be hard pressed to find one that does not refer in some context to the great joy of taking a bath. Sand storms were frequent, often blinding, and unrelentingly found its way into the troops clothes, bedding and food as well as wreaking havoc on planes, vehicles and equipment. By day the temperature could soar to well over a 100 deg and by night drop to near freezing with little relief possible from either. In many cases a camp or aerodrome consisted of nothing but tents, with the occasional shack built out of empty barrels and packing crates, plunked down in the sand in the middle of nowhere. The ever present millions of flys, fleas and perpetual lack of fresh anything rounded out their living conditions to make it a true hell on earth. For thousands of young men, an unmarked grave in this hell would become their home for eternity.
THE BACKDROP When Italy declared war on France June 10, 1940 and invaded Malta on the 11th, the RAF Middle East Command under Sir Aurther Longmore had barely 300 usefull aircraft (many were outdated bi-planes) in 29 squadrons dispersed over an area of several million square miles. At best only half these squadrons had modern aircraft, the bulk of these being concentrated in Egypt. In contrast the Italian dictator Benito Mussolini alone had some 215,000 men and 280 aircraft in the North African coastal provinces and Italian colony of Libya, not to mention easy reinforcements from home. After the fall of France, with the threat of French Tunis removed, Mussolini began massing his troops and equipment near Libya`s Eastern border (Cyrenaica) scarcely a few miles from British protected Egypt. The apparent and logical purpose of which was an attack on the suez canal through Egypt. This attack, if successfull, would virtually choke off Britans last supply route to the East.
Immediately on one side of this border were 70,000 Italians poised with mostly modern equipment supported by a supply route in the form of a 'rather vulnerable' but first class road stretching 1000 miles from the Egyptian front back to their main base at Tripoli. Spaced along the way were ammunition dumps at Sollum, Bardia, Tobruk, Derna and Benghazi. Vastly outnumbered on the other side, was 50,000 British Troops spread thinly across most of Egypt, their equipment and supply route was even more dismal. From the major center of Alexandria in Egypt it was 200 miles of good road and railway to the closest heavily defended position at the railway terminus of Mersa Matruh. From here, for a further 70 miles there was a good metalled supply road for reinforcements but only as far as Sidi Barani. Thence the last 50 miles to the 70, 000 Italians on the frontier at Sollum, the road was not capable of seriously supporting the British front against major attack. On this basis it was deemed prudent by all, including the Chiefs, Generals and Churchill himself, to take a defensive position, strengthen Mersa Matruh, and await the Italians.
The RAF did no such thing, immediately on the declaration of war by the Italians the RAF began strikes against enemy aerodromes across the Egyptian border in Libya.
This 'defensive' plan would be secretly changed to an "offensive" plan leading to heated exchanges between Churchill, and General`s Wilson and Wavell over Churchills demand they send forces to the aid of Greece. Churchill wanting to use Greece for strategic political purposes, had long before promised to come to the aid of the Greeks if attacked, the Greeks fearing reprisals by the Germans refused all but a token British presence up untill the last moment. The Generals were of course concerned that this depletion of forces would undermine the success of their planned secret "offensive". In one of several obnoxious telegrams from Churchill to Mr Eden (Secretary of State) but aimed at Wavell, Wilson and Longmore's dissention, he antagonized and insulted these veteran Generals with remarks like "Safety first" is the road to ruin in war", "Emergencies must be met in war as they come, and local views must not subjugate main issue, finally he accused them of being fixated on a "set piece battle". Churchill would later claim he didn`t know the plan had changed, he assumed the troops were standing around idle awaiting attack as per the originally planned defensive. Nonetheless, reinforcements to Greece were commited and the reality was that these squadrons which Wavell felt he needed for his offensive "were" sacrificed to Greece for a cause that all agreed was "too little, too late". Fortunately, this uproar likely saved many more of the RAF`s finest from being sent to a similar fate. Ironically Hitler was not happy with the affairs in Greece either, in a letter to Mussolini's right hand minion Molotov, Hitler expressed his disspleasure of Italys war on Greece as it diverted forces to the periphery instead of concentrating them against England. (Molotov a pitifull man who incidentally was both a liar and weasal, was so far beneath the intellectual capacity of those with whom he dealt, it is unlikely he could even partially grasp the great events of which he was a part.)
add map of roads above showing position of forces and layout of countries
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