Akyab
Magwe
(Sittang Valley)
- Toungoo
- Kedaw Airfield
Lashio
Mingaladon (Rangoon area)
- Zayatkwin
- Johnny Walker
Hmwabi - Highland Queen
Magwe
Dimapur (Nagaland Province)
(Imphal Valley)
- Patharkandi
- Tulihal
Silchar (Assam Province)
Onbauk
Ondaw
Kwetgne
Kinmagon
Meiktila
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BURMA
AERODROMES, ALG's, KUTCHA STRIPS, BASES
HOW THEY CAME TO BE
Burma is a cul-de-sac with a long tongue of jungle escarpment reaching South from Moulmein to Victoria Point. The Port of Rangoon therefore provided the only means of maintaining an Air Force in Burma, since on the West, Burma is cut off from India by the dense jungle escarpments of the Arakan. Yomas, in the North by the Naga Hills, in the East by the Karenni Hills, while the Pegu Yomas, a mountain range, divides the waters of the Sittang and the Irrawaddy which flow almost their entire distance through Burma to Rangoon and the 'Gulf of Martaban. Thus there were two Valleys in which airfields could be made. Quote: Air Vice Marshall D F Stevenson 1942
Mingaladon is the main aerodrome for Rangoon.
Prewar 1940 to 1941
As a result of the Singapore Conference in the autumn of 1940 (para. 6), the findings of which were generally endorsed by the C.-in-C. Far East on his arrival, the Government of Burma co-operated actively in constructing and developing the eight air bases, and additional satellite strips, considered necessary for air operations from Burma. These bases stretched from Mergui on the Tenasserim Coast in a half circle round the Siamese frontier to Lashio in the Northern Shan states. In anticipation of approval, Flight Lieutenant C.W. Bailey, Inspector of Landing Grounds at A.H.Q., had been sent by A.H.Q. to Burma in November, 1940. He had drawn up plans for extending old, and constructing new, aerodromes. Further, in co-operation with the Government of Burma, arrangements had been made for reorganising the Public Works Department so that it could undertake supervision of construction, which was immediately begun.
In March, 1941, H.Q. No. 221 Group (Commander, Group Captain E. R. Manning) was established at Rangoon to develop these bases and to command the Air Forces located in Burma. Although the Group staff was very small, progress was so good that all bases were completed by the end of 1941 with accommodation at each for some 450 all ranks. Facilities for dispersal were reasonable, pens being provided, as were some satellite strips. There was a measure of A.A. protection in the Rangoon area but none elsewhere.
Co-operation with the Army in Burma was excellent. Army H.Q. in Burma and No. 221 Group R.A.F. were in close proximity and the G.O.C. and his staff could not have done more to assist the R.A.F. in its preparations. The raising and training of aerodrome defence troops was consequently conducted in parallel with construction. During 1940, an air observer system was developed by the G.O.C. and despite difficulties of training, it developed and operated usefully on the outbreak of hostilities; control of it passed to the R.A.F. on the formation of 221 Group Headquarters. One Radar Station was completed at Moulmein and two others in the Rangoon area were nearing completion when war broke out. A Fighter Control Operations room was designed and constructed in Rangoon. SOURCE: Excerpt from GOC Report, London Gazette 1948
STATUS IN JANUARY 1942
To May 22, 1942
By May 22, Rangoon had fallen and the British were driven out of Burma. On the 01/01/1942 Air Vice Marshall D F Stevenson assumed command of Air Forces in Burma. The following is his report on the status as he found it on this date as well as events. Note that there are several errors in his report.
The main line of airfields ran from Victoria Point to Moulmein, to Rangoon and Mingaladon and then up the Valley of the Sittang through Toungoo to the East, through Heho and Namsang and up to Lashio in the North, a total distance of some 800 miles. This line of aerodromes faced the enemy air force based in Thailand and because the territory to the East and South East of this line of air bases was mountainous country covered by jungle, through which there were few if any communications, it followed that situated here adequate R.D.F. and telephone warning, of the approach of enemy aircraft attempting, to attack our bases was impossible. Had Toungoo, Heho and Namsang been situated with their attendant satellites in the Irrawaddy Valley, warning would have been possible and satisfactory as long as the communications in the Sittang Valley remained in our hands. This, fact gravely influenced the air campaign.
In general, the aerodrome development and construction undertaken on behalf of the Far East Command by the Government in Burma showed an extremely good state of affairs. Indeed, remarkable. All airfields had one or two ail-weather runways fit for modern aircraft of the heaviest type. Accommodation for personnel, P.O.L. and bombs and ammunition were available and all-weather satellites were provided for most airfields. (Accomodation was available? That statements a bad joke, note that later in his report he complains of the lack of multiple headquarters and staff for himself) Moreover, at this time of the year the paddy fields were hard and, provided labour was available, a runway suitable for fighter or bomber aircraft could be prepared in a week. Thus airfield accommodation for a considerable air force was available in Burma. The weakness of the lay-out, however, was, as already stated, that the four main airfields between Toungoo and Lashio (inclusive) had little or no warning.
Consequently, from the point of view of airfields, there was nothing to prevent the reception of considerable reinforcements as long as we held Rangoon. The position as regards Headquarters and Station Staffs was not good. Only a nucleus H.Q. staff existed and Mingaladon was the only airfield having a Station H.Q.
As regards communications, a good" telephone system connected all our airfields, while point-to-point wireless was in course of being put in to parent Stations. I found the Burma Observer Corps under the command of Major Taylor to be, over the area covered, an efficient warning system. As long as main centres of communications and telephone Lines were not closely threatened by land attack the system functioned devotedly and satisfactorily.
In respect of aerodrome defence I found that outlying Station airfields such as Tavoy and Mergui had garrisons while detachments of troops for land defence and anti sabotage precautions had been provided at occupied airfields. A.A. defence was weak, with an initial strength of but one battery of locally raised troops, whose equipment had only arrived at the end of December, 1941. The later arrival of 'British and Indian light and heavy batteries rendered it possible to organise a weak scale of defence for the important vital points. Although the A.A. defence did yeoman service they were never in sufficient strength to provide adequate defence for all the vital points and areas let alone our airfields. Except for a weak airfield detachment the A.A Artillery was deployed in defence of vital points in Rangoon and of our troops so that some cover against enemy bomb attacks in forward areas could be provided. Later during the withdrawal they provided such close protection as was practicable for our columns 'General Alexander "has remarked upon this phase of the operations in ihis ' Despatch. For light automatic defence ( L.A.A.) against low-flying aircraft, detachments of the B.A.F. each equipped with 10 to 12 .5 Browning machine guns on1 A.A. mountings, were stationed at Mingaladon and Zayatkwin and later at Magwe. They were manned entirely by Burmese personnel mainly of the 12th Burma Rifles. Their training was of necessity hurried and their numbers were generally much under strength.. Elements of the R A.F. regiment arrived too late to be of much service although they were in action at Akyab. All other airfields had care and maintenance parties.
SOURCE: EXTRACT: Air Vice Marshall D F Stevenson status report as at 01/01/1942 when he assumed command, from General Wavell's report 28/09/1942 to the Chiefs of Stall, London.
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